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Abstract
In this paper, we follow the micro-to-macro approach of Fajgelbaum et al. (2020)
and analyze the impacts of the 2018–2019 U.S.-China trade war on the Chinese econ-
omy. We use highly disaggregated trade and tariff data with monthly frequency to
identify the demand/supply elasticities of Chinese imports/exports, combined with a
general equilibrium model for the Chinese economy (that takes into account input-
output linkages, and regional heterogeneity in employment and sector specialization)
to quantify the partial and general equilibrium effects of the tariff war at the prod-
uct/sector/region/aggregate levels. This complements the studies that focus on the ex
post response of the U.S. economy by Amiti, Redding and Weinstein (2019), Fajgel-
baum et al. (2020), and Cavallo et al. (2020).
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1 Introduction
During 2018–2019, in an unprecedented manner since 1930s, the U.S. Trump administration
imposed seven rounds of tariff increases that affected Chinese exports. This includes the
first round in February 2018, on solar panel and washing machine imports, and the second
targeting iron, aluminum and steel products. They were followed by three rounds of tariff
hikes in 2018 and two in 2019, targeting imports specifically from China. All told, these
seven rounds of tariff increases affected $325.1 billion (14.27%) of Chinese exports across
6428 HS-8 products (using 2017 pre-war trade values). The average U.S. statutory tariff
rate on these Chinese products increased from 3.55% to 28.53%.
In return, China raised tariffs on U.S. products (four rounds in 2018 and two in 2019). In
total, 5833 distinct HS-8 products imported from the U.S. were targeted during the period
2018:1–2019:12. In 2017 trade values, these affected $109.3 billion (or 5.93%) of Chinese
imports. The average retaliation tariff rate increased from 6.46% to 21.27%. As China
raised its tariffs against U.S. products, it also unilaterally lowered its Most-Favored-Nation
(MFN) tariff rates on imports from non-U.S. sources where the MFN rate applied. This
took place in four rounds during 2018:5–11. All told, the lists covered 3054 products, with
a pre-war trade value of $145.7 billion (or 7.90% of Chinese imports in 2017). The average
tariff rate across these products decreased from 9.89% to 6.82%.
In the literature, Amiti, Redding and Weinstein (2019), Fajgelbaum et al. (2020), and
Cavallo et al. (2020) have evaluated the ex-post impacts on the U.S. economy of the 2018–
2019 trade war (in terms of prices, import/export quantities, real wages, and welfare), given
events up to 2018:12, 2019:4, and 2019:7, respectively. These studies generally employ highly
disaggregated product and tariff line classifications, with a strong focus on identifying the
U.S. demand and supply structure at the micro product/variety level and their corresponding
elasticities. On the other hand, studies by Charbonneau and Landry (2018), Guo et al. (2018)
and Itakura (2020) conducted ex-ante predictions of the trade-war effects using, respectively,
the quantitative models of Caliendo and Parro (2015) and the GTAP CGE model (based on
tariff changes imposed in the early phase of the trade war and/or proposed tariff changes
at the time of their studies). Given the nature of their modeling frameworks, the trade
and tariff changes are typically organized at the sector level, with emphasis on general
equilibrium adjustment across sectors and countries. Li et al. (2020) similarly examined the
welfare impacts of the trade war based on the GTAP model, but with analysis incorporating
the tariff revisions as of 2020:3 (after the Phase One Deal was reached between the U.S. and
China on December 13, 2019). The trade elasticities used in these studies are often taken
from the literature based on sector-level trade analysis, or built-in parameters assumed by
2
the GTAP models.
In this paper, we follow the micro-to-macro approach of Fajgelbaum et al. (2020) and
analyze the impacts of the trade war on the Chinese economy. We use highly disaggregated
trade and tariff data with monthly frequency to identify the demand/supply elasticities of
Chinese imports/exports, and a general equilibrium model for the Chinese economy (that
takes into account input-output linkages, and regional heterogeneity in employment and
sector specialization) to quantify the general equilibrium effects of the tariff war at the
product/sector/region/aggregate levels. In particular, we compile China’s import and export
data with monthly frequency for the period 2017:1–2019:12, in terms of both quantities and
values, at the 8-digit Harmonized System (HS) level. We similarly compile the Chinese tariff
rates on imports (at the HS-8 level) and the foreign tariff rates on China’s exports (at the
HS-6 digit) with monthly frequency, which are constructed based on the baseline statutory
tariff rates implemented across countries at the beginning of 2017 and the tariff changes
associated with the tariff war as announced by the Ministry of Finance, China (and the U.S.
Trade Representative) during 2018:1–2019:12.
Corresponding to the setup of Fajgelbaum et al. (2020) for the U.S. economy, the demand
system we estimate for the Chinese economy builds in reallocations across imported varieties
(defined as country-product pairs), across imported products (defined as 8-digit HS product
codes), and between imported and domestic products within a sector (defined as a 2-digit
GB/T code, a standard Chinese industry classification system). This demand system is
interacted with foreign export supply at the variety level, and with their joint effects on
prices and quantities aggregated up the hierarchy of demand to the product and sector
levels. As highlighted by Fajgelbaum et al. (2020) and Zoutman et al. (2018), the estimation
of the import demand and foreign export supply elasticities relies on changes in tariffs that
are uncorrelated with demand and supply shocks at the variety level. Tests are conducted
to support the validity of using tariff shocks during the period 2018–2019 as a source of
identification. Table A.1 summarizes the partial (direct) impacts on Chinese imports and
exports, using the elasticity estimates and the average tariff changes due to the trade war.
Imports of U.S. products targeted by Chinese import tariffs fell on average by 17.76%;
imports of products with targeted varieties fell on average by 1.38%; and imports in sectors
with targeted varieties fell on average by 2.69%. The MFN tariff cuts extended by China
on non-U.S. MFN sources of imports cushioned the negative impacts substantially. Imports
from these sources are estimated to have increased by 4.46% for targeted varieties, 0.02% for
targeted products, and 0.03% for targeted sectors due to the tariff cuts. With the opposing
effects combined, the overall drop in Chinese imports of targeted varieties is estimated to
be 1.68%; and that of targeted products/sectors to be merely 0.01%. On the other hand,
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exports of Chinese products targeted by the U.S. tariffs fell by 9%. The estimated impacts
on China’s imports are in general smaller than the U.S. counterpart reported by Fajgelbaum
et al. (2020). This is due to two reasons. First, the elasticities we estimate for the Chinese
economy are smaller in magnitude than the U.S. counterparts obtained by the study above.
Thus, the response of imports to a given tariff increase is smaller in the case of China. In
addition, the quantum of Chinese imports subject to the Chinese retaliatory tariffs is smaller
than that of U.S. imports targeted by the U.S. tariff hikes.
We then simulate for the Chinese economy the general equilibrium effects of the tariff
shocks, given the elasticity parameters estimated above (at variety/product/sector level),
and a supply-side structure calibrated to the observed labor allocation across Chinese sector-
provinces, input-output structures across sectors, consumption allocation across non-tradable
and tradable sectors, capital/labor/intermediate cost share in sector-level production, and
imports and exports across varieties. The system is large in dimension, including endogenous
prices for each variety, product, and sector, wages for each sector-province, and final and
intermediate expenditures across sectors. Thus, as in Fajgelbaum et al. (2020), the system
is solved as a first-order linear approximation in log changes around the pre-war equilibrium
in 2017 given the China-U.S. tariff shocks during 2018:1–2019:12.
Table 8 summarizes the effects on producers/exporters (EV X), consumers/buyers of
imports (EV M), and tariff revenue (∆R) in columns (1)–(3) and the aggregate impacts in
column (4). Our analysis suggests large negative consequences of the trade war on both
Chinese producers and consumers, which dominate the positive tariff revenue increase. The
loss of the producers (exporters) is approximately double the loss of the buyers of imports.
China sustained an aggregate loss of $21.636 billion, or 0.178% of its GDP, as a result of
the trade war. Without counter-retaliation, its loss would have been much larger, at $28.491
billion (0.235% of GDP), and would have been largely borne by the producers (exporters).
The retaliation against the U.S. imports shifted the burden to the Chinese buyers of imports
such that producers (exporters) and buyers (importers) sustained about the same magnitude
of loss. Further adjustment in the MFN tariff rates on non-U.S. imports lessened the loss of
Chinese buyers of imports and shifted part of the burden back to the producers.
To illustrate the variation in exposure to the trade war across provinces in China, we con-
struct the province-level exposure of tradable sectors by first computing the trade-weighted
tariff changes by GB/T-2 sector and then mapping them to provinces based on provinces’
employment structure. Figure 2 suggests that China tended to: (A) retaliate against the U.S.
in sectors with a relatively high concentration in the outlying provinces such as Xinjiang,
Hainan, and Heilongjiang; and (B) reduce MFN tariffs on sectors concentrated in provinces
closer to the coast such as Shanghai and Beijing. Overall, China’s tariff increases tended
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to be biased toward inner provinces and turn negative in the Eastern provinces. Added to
the burden, Panel (D) suggests that these provinces also faced higher tariff increase on their
exports to the U.S.
Figure 3 summarizes the effects of the trade war on real wage across provinces in general
equilibrium. Every province experienced a reduction in the tradable real wage. Provinces
with larger relative losses are concentrated in the Southeast, whose employment structures
were hit more strongly by the U.S. tariff increase. The real wage losses would have been
one level higher without the MFN tariff cuts by China. This contrasts with the finding
in Table 8, where the MFN tariff cuts by China worsen the aggregate loss. This implies
that the MFN tariff cuts help cushion the impacts on workers/consumers via lower import
prices, at the cost of producers (and the owners of capital and fixed structures), who face
steeper competition in the product market. Overall, on average across provinces, the nominal
wages for workers in tradable sectors decreased by 1.69%. These income losses were however
cushioned by a lower cost of living, as the CPI of tradable goods decreased by 1.16% on
average across sectors. As a result, real wages in the tradable sector fell by 0.24%.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 summarizes the data used
for the analysis and the timeline of the tariff events. Section 3 outlines the economic structure
modeled. Section 4 presents the estimation results of elasticities and partial equilibrium
impacts on trade. Section 5 presents the general equilibrium effects at the aggregate, across
sources of imports and destination of exports, and across Chinese provinces. Section 6
concludes.
2 Data and Timeline
2.1 Data
We obtained the Chinese baseline tariff rates from the UN TRAINS database and its tariff
rate changes from the Ministry of Finance, China. The former is available at the 10-digit
Harmonized System (HS) level and the data were aggregated and matched to the latter,
available at the HS-8 level. Starting with the baseline import tariff rate in January 2017,
we update the rates at monthly frequency, given the official announcement by the Ministry
of Finance, China, of any tariff changes. Only tariff changes announced in association with
the tariff war are used as sources of variations in the instrumental variable to identify the
import demand and export supply elasticities.
We similarly obtained the baseline tariff faced by Chinese exports from the UN TRAINS
database. These data are harmonized across countries up to the HS-6 digit level. The infor-
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mation on the U.S. tariff increase associated with the trade war is based on Fajgelbaum et al.
(2019) (for tariff changes in 2018) and the Office of the United States Trade Representative
(USTR) (for tariff changes in 2019). The tariff changes are aggregated from the HS-10 to
the HS-6 level by simple averaging. The estimations of trade elasticities for Chinese exports
are nonetheless conducted at the HS-8 level of trade (with the HS-6 tariffs assigned to all
HS-8 products in the category). Because we work with monthly data and the tariffs were
implemented in the middle of months, we scale the tariff increases by the number of days of
the month they were in effect.
We obtained China’s trade data with monthly frequency for the period 2017:1–2019:12
from the General Administration of Customs, China. We observed the Chinese imports and
exports at the HS-8 digit level (which we refer to as products) by the source of imports
and the destination of exports. Country-product pairs are referred to as varieties. For each
variety, the customs data report the quantities of imports and exports, the value of imports
at the CIF price, and the value of exports at the FOB price. The import and export values
are reported in current USD values.
We classify sectors using the China Industry Classification system (GB/T 4754), which is
widely used in the reporting of official statistics on companies and organizations throughout
Mainland China. The sector-level data at the GB/T 2-digit level (denoted GB/T-2) are
obtained from China’s National Bureau of Statistics. These include the producer price index
for industrial products (PPI); the sectoral output in monthly frequency; and the input-output
(IO) tables for 2017. For the analysis in the paper, we classify GB/T-2 sectors as tradable
if they are matched to an HS-6 code in the trade data.
For the general equilibrium analysis, we collect the annual employment and wage data at
the sector and province level from China Labor Statistical Yearbook of 2017. It records the
employment and total wages of urban units by sector and province. These are available for 31
provinces and 94 GB/T-2 sectors (covering services, agriculture, mining and manufacturing
sectors). All 39 tradable sectors are covered individually in both the IO tables and the
labor statistics dataset. We aggregate the remaining sectors as a single non-tradable sector,
reconciling the IO tables and the labor statistics dataset. More details about the data used
are provided in Appendix A.
2.2 Timeline
Table 1 reports the list of tariff events enacted by the U.S. (Panel A) and China (Panel B1
and B2) during the period 2018:1–2019:12 of the trade war. For each tariff event, we identify
the number of HS-8 products targeted and the quantum (and percentages) of Chinese exports
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and imports (in million USD) affected by the U.S. and Chinese tariff changes, respectively,
based on 2017 pre-war trade flows. We summarize the extent of tariff changes in each event
by the simple average of tariff rates (in percentage points) across targeted products before
and after the implementation. Figure 1 illustrates the timing and the tariff changes.1
Panel A of Table 1 reports the seven waves of U.S. statutory tariff increases that affected
Chinese exports during the period. This includes the first wave of tariff increases in February
2018 applied to solar panel and washing machine imports, and the second wave of tariffs,
which targeted iron, aluminum, and steel products. They were followed by three tranches of
tariff hikes in 2018 and two tranches in 2019, targeting imports specifically from China. In
total, these seven rounds of tariff increase covered $325.1 billion (14.27%) of total Chinese
exports across 6428 HS-8 products (using 2017 pre-war trade flows). The average U.S.
statutory tariff rate on these Chinese products increased from 3.55% to 28.53%.
Panel B1 of Table 1 lists the seven rounds of China’s retaliatory tariffs on U.S. products.
All told, 5833 distinct HS-8 products imported from the U.S. were targeted. In 2017 trade
values, these affected $109.3 billion (or 5.93%) of Chinese imports. The average retaliation
tariff rate increased from 6.46% to 21.27%. The first wave of tariff increases by China against
imports from the U.S. were enacted on April 2, 2018. China increased the tariff (by 15%–
25%) on U.S. products (worth about $3 billion), including fruit, wine, seamless steel pipes,
pork and recycled aluminum, in response to the U.S. steel and aluminum tariffs. In July
and August 2018, China implemented two rounds of retaliatory tariff increases (by 25%)
on U.S. products, including agricultural products, automobiles and aquatic products (List
1), and commodities such as coal, copper scrap, fuel, buses and medical equipment (List
2), respectively. In September 2018, China continued to respond to U.S. tariffs and enacted
another round of tariff increases on about $60 billion worth of U.S. goods (List 3). In January
2019, China revised its lists and exempted U.S. autos (from an extra 25% tariff) and certain
U.S. auto parts (from an extra 5% tariff). But as the tariff war escalated, in June and July
2019, China further increased tariffs on more than $68 billion worth of products imported
from the U.S.
As China raised its tariffs against the U.S. products, it also unilaterally lowered its MFN
tariff rates on imports from non-U.S. sources where MFN rates apply. Panel B2 of Table 1
summarizes four waves of China’s MFN tariff cuts in May to November 2018. Products
1In estimations and welfare analysis, the tariff changes applicable to a month are scaled by the number of
days the changes are in effect in a month. Refer to the Data Appendix for additional details. For illustration
purposes only, in Table 1 and Figure 1, the implementation month is taken to be the current month if
the implementation date is before the 15th of the month and the next month otherwise. The ‘before’ and
‘after’ simple monthly average tariff rates correspond to that in the month before and the month after the
implementation month.
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affected include pharmaceuticals (May), autos and ITA products (July), a subset of consumer
goods (July) and industrial goods (November). In total, the lists covered 3,054 products,
with a pre-war trade value of $145.7 billion (or 7.90% of Chinese imports in 2017). The
average tariff rate across these products decreased from 9.89% to 6.82%.
Table 2 reports the summary statistics for import varieties and Chinese products tar-
geted by the tariff war across GB/T-2 codes. For Chinese imports, we report the number
of targeted HS-8 products and varieties, and the means and standard deviations of tariff
increases across targeted varieties within GB/T-2 codes. The Chinese sectors that received
the most protection from tariff increase on U.S. products were agricultural products, chem-
icals, fuel, metals and waste resources. In contrast, the sectors of food, textiles, articles for
culture activities, and automobiles are shown to have been subject to MFN tariff cuts to a
larger extent. On the export side, the table indicates that Chinese sectors that faced the
largest tariff increase by the U.S. were metals, electrical equipment, machinery and computer
products.
3 Economic Structure
In this section, we set up the economic structure à la Fajgelbaum et al. (2020). Sections 3.1–
3.2 describe the demand/supply structure that guides the estimation in Section 4. Section 3.3
develops a full general equilibrium system that forms the basis of the welfare analysis in
Section 5.
3.1 The Demand System and Preferences
Suppose there are S tradable sectors indexed by s. Within each of these sectors, aggregate
demand (from producers and consumers) follows a three-tier CES structure: in the first
tier, goods are differentiated by domestic and imported goods (denoted as Ds and Ms re-
spectively); in the second tier, by products (indexed by g) within the domestic or imported
bundle; and in the third tier, by varieties (indexed by ig), differentiated by country of origin i
within each imported product.
In particular, in the first tier, the demand from consumers for consumption (Cs) and
the demand from producers for intermediate inputs (Is) follow the CES structure with an
elasticity of substitution κ between the domestic and imported goods:
Cs + Is =
(
A
1
κ
DsD
κ−1
κ
s + A
1
κ
MsM
κ−1
κ
s
) κ
κ−1
, (1)
and sector-level demand shifters for domestic and imported goods (ADs and AMs), respec-
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tively. This implies a sector-level price index:
Ps =
(
ADsP
1−κ
Ds + AMsP
1−κ
Ms
) 1
1−κ , (2)
given the price indices of domestic and imported goods (PDs and PMs) in sector s.
In the second tier, the domestic or imported composite (Ds or Ms) is each CES aggregate
of products within the sector (dg,mg), with an elasticity of substitution η and demand shifter
aDg or aMg for g ∈ Gs:
Ds =
(∑
g∈Gs
a
1
η
Dgd
η−1
η
g
) η
η−1
, (3)
Ms =
(∑
g∈Gs
a
1
η
Mgm
η−1
η
g
) η
η−1
. (4)
The corresponding price indices are:
PDs =
(∑
g∈Gs
aDgp
1−η
Dg
) 1
1−η
, (5)
PMs =
(∑
g∈Gs
aMgp
1−η
Mg
) 1
1−η
, (6)
given the prices of domestic and imported products (pDg and pMg) for g ∈ Gs.
Finally, in the third tier, the imported products (mg) are further CES aggregates of
varieties (mig) differentiated by country of origin i, with an elasticity of substitution σ and
demand shifter aig:
mg =
(∑
i
a
1
σ
igm
σ−1
σ
ig
) σ
σ−1
, (7)
and the associated price index:
pMg =
(∑
i
aigp
1−σ
ig
) 1
1−σ
, (8)
given the variety price pig. The above demand system implies that the values of demand for
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domestic goods and imported goods in sector s are:
PDsDs = EsADs
(
PDs
Ps
)1−κ
, (9)
PMsMs = EsAMs
(
PMs
Ps
)1−κ
, (10)
where Es are aggregate expenditures in sector s (by both final consumers and firms). In
turn, the value of imports for product g in sector s is:
pMgmg = PMsMsaMg
(
pMg
PMs
)1−η
, (11)
and the quantity imported of product g’s variety from country i is:
mig = mgaig
(
pig
pMg
)−σ
(12)
where aig is a demand shock and pig is the consumer price of the variety mig. Given the ad
valorem tariff rate τig imposed on a variety and the variety’s CIF price p
∗
ig before tariff, the
consumer price of the variety is:
pig = (1 + τig) p
∗
ig. (13)
In summary, the three-tier demand system described here depends on three elasticities:
across imports and domestic goods within sector, κ; across products within import or do-
mestic composite, η; and across imported varieties within product, σ.
In the general equilibrium, to study the regional effects of tariffs, we divide China into
R regions (effectively provinces). Each region is indexed by r and the set of regions is
denoted by R. There is one non-tradable sector in addition to the set of tradable sectors
described above. Tradable sectors are freely traded within China but subject to trade costs
internationally. The representative consumer in each region r is assumed to have a Cobb-
Douglas preference for the non-tradable and tradable goods:
βNT lnCNT,r +
∑
s∈S
βs lnCsr (14)
where CNT,r is the consumption of the homogeneous non-tradable good, Csr is the consump-
tion of the tradable goods of sector s, and the β’s add to 1. Consumers in a region r face
the price of the non-tradable good PNT,r and the price index Ps for each sector s.
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3.2 The Foreign Counterpart
For each trade partner, its export supply to China and its import demand for Chinese product
at the variety level are specified as follows to fully characterize the international markets.
For a product from country i, China faces an inverse foreign export-supply curve according
to:
p∗ig = z
∗
igm
ω∗
ig , (15)
where z∗ig is a foreign export supply shifter, and ω
∗ is the inverse foreign export supply
elasticity. The larger the parameter is, the more China can extract a decrease in the supply
price from the exporter and hence the larger the potential gain from imposing import tariffs.
The foreign import demand for the variety from China of product g is assumed to be
similar to China’s import variety demand:
xig = a
∗
ig
((
1 + τ ∗ig
)
pXig
)−σ∗
, (16)
where xig is country i’ demand for product g from China, a
∗
ig is a foreign import demand
shifter, τ ∗ig is the ad valorem tariff set by country i on China’s exports of good g, p
X
ig is
the price received by China’s exporters, and σ∗ is the corresponding foreign import demand
elasticity.
3.3 The Supply-Side Structure
Production of tradable goods in each sector-region uses workers, intermediate inputs, and
a fixed factor (capital and structures). In the short run, the primary factors of production
(capital and labor) are assumed to be immobile across regions and sectors. In deriving the
system’s hat algebra, Appendix B also considers the implications of perfect labor mobility
across sectors. In particular, the production of tradable goods in a sector-region is assumed
to be:
Qsr = Zsr
(
Isr
αIs
)αIs (Lsr
αLs
)αLs
(17)
where Zsr is the productivity of sector s in region r, Isr is the use of intermediate input
bundle, Lsr is the labor input, and αIs and αLs are the cost shares of intermediate goods
and labor in total sales of sector s, respectively.
The intermediate input bundle used by sector s is assumed to be a Cobb-Douglas aggre-
gate of inputs from other sectors, with αs
′
s representing the share of input s
′ in total sales of
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sector s. This implies that the cost of the intermediate input bundle used by sector s is:
φs ∝
∏
s′∈S
P
αs
′
s
αIs
s′ (18)
The owners of the fixed factor choose inputs Isr and Lsr to minimize the cost of produc-
tion, given the cost of the intermediate input bundle φs; the wage rate wsr in sector s and
region r; and the production target Qsr. Given the producer price ps in sector s, the fixed
factor owners then choose the production level Qsr that maximizes their profit:
Πsr ≡ max
Qsr
psQsr − φsIsr(Qsr)− wsrLsr(Qsr)
= max
Qsr
psQsr − (1− αKs)
(
φαIss w
αLs
sr
Zsr
Qsr
) 1
1−αKs
, (19)
where αKs ≡ 1−αIs−αLs is the share of capital cost in total sales of sector s. This implies
an optimal output choice as a function of output and factor prices:
Qsr = Z
1
αKs
sr p
1−αKs
αKs
s φ
− αIs
αKs
s w
− αLs
αKs
sr , (20)
and the national production in sector s:
Qs =
∑
r∈R
Qsr. (21)
The non-tradable sector is assumed to use only labor for production: QNTr = Z
NT
r L
NT
r ,
where ZNTr is the labor productivity of region r in the non-tradable sector, and L
NT
r is the
employment in this sector in region r.
Output by sector Qs is assumed to be allocated across products qg at a constant marginal
rate of transformation according to: ∑
g∈Gs
qg
zg
= Qs (22)
where zg is a product-level productivity shock. Assuming perfect competition, this pins
down the local price of the domestic variety of product g at pDg =
ps
zg
. The price of the
same variety when shipped to a foreign country i is pXig = δigpDg, given the iceberg trade cost
12
factor δig. The market-clearing for the local variety of product g requires that:
qg = (aDgDs)
(
pDg
PDs
)−η
︸ ︷︷ ︸
dg
+
∑
i∈I
δig a
∗
ig
((
1 + τ ∗ig
)
pXig
)−σ∗︸ ︷︷ ︸
xig
(23)
Labor income and profits are assumed to be spent where they are generated. Total
tariff revenue R and national trade deficit D are assumed to be distributed to each region
in proportion to the population share br of the region. Thus, by accounting identity, final
expenditures in region r are:
Xr = wNT,rLNT,r +
∑
s∈S
wsrLsr +
∑
s∈S
Πsr + br (D +R)
= PNT,rQNT,r +
∑
s∈S
(1− αIs) psrQsr + br (D +R) . (24)
Finally, the optimal output choice Qsr in (20) implies an (inverse) labor demand function
in sector s of region r:
wsr =
(
Zsrps
(Lsr/αLs)αKsφ
αIs
s
) 1
1−αIs
, (25)
and an average wage for the tradable sectors in region r:
wTr =
∑
s∈S wsrLsr∑
s∈S Lsr
. (26)
The wage in the non-tradable sector is then pinned down by the market-clearing condition:
wNTr =
βNTXr
LNTr
. (27)
A general equilibrium given tariffs consists of import prices {p∗ig}, producer prices {ps},
price indices {pMg, PMs, PDs, Ps, φs}, tradable sector wages {wsr} and non-tradable sector
wages {wNTr } such that (i) given these prices, consumers, producers and workers optimize
their choices; (ii) domestic markets for final goods and intermediate inputs clear, interna-
tional markets for imports and exports of every variety clear, and labor markets for every
sector and region clear; and (iii) the government budget is balanced.
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4 Identification and Estimation
In this section, we estimate the 3-tier demand system using the variation of import tariffs
associated with the trade war as exogenous instruments, and conduct pretrend tests to
support the validity of the instruments.
4.1 China import demand and foreign export supply elasticities
at variety level (σ, ω∗)
Following Fajgelbaum et al. (2020), we use variation of China’s import tariffs to estimate
China’s import demand and foreign export supply elasticities at the variety level. As sug-
gested by Zoutman, Gavrilova and Hopland (2018), if the tariff variations are uncorrelated
with the unobserved import demand and export supply shocks, we can identify the demand
and supply elasticities simultaneously with the variation in tariffs as the instrument. The
idea is that given the price received by foreign suppliers, an increase in tariff shifts the import
demand curve downward and helps trace the foreign export supply curve. Similarly, given
the price paid by buyers of imports, a tariff increase shifts the foreign export supply curve
upward, helping to identify the import demand curve.
In particular, we use China’s increase in import tariffs against U.S. products, and decrease
in MFN tariffs against non-U.S. sources, announced in association with the U.S.-China trade
war during 2018:1–2019:12 as the instrument. Tariff changes due to free-trade agreements
or regular adjustments (e.g., twice yearly MFN tariff revisions) are not included/used as
exogenous variations. Specifically, by adding a time subscript (t) and taking the log-difference
in the import demand equation (12) and foreign export supply equation (15), we have:
∆ lnmigt = ψ
m
ig + ψ
m
st − σ∆ ln pigt + εmigt, (28)
∆ ln p∗igt = ψ
p∗
ig + ψ
p∗
st + ω
∗∆ lnmigt + ε
p∗
igt, (29)
where $ = {p∗,m}, and ψ$ig and ψ$st are variety and sector-time fixed effects, εmigt and
εp
∗
igt are the respective import demand and export supply residuals, collecting shocks to
import demand ∆ ln aigt and export supply ∆ ln z
∗
igt, respectively, and other unobservables.
In contrast to the U.S., which slapped tariffs against multiple sources in selected sectors
and also against China in multiple products, China’s tariff increase was mainly targeted at
the U.S. versus non-U.S. MFN sources of imports of selected products. There are limited
variations across countries; thus, we cannot adopt the same set of fixed effects (FE) controls
as in Fajgelbaum et al. (2020). In particular, we drop the country-time (it) FE, and replace
the remaining set of FEs (gt, is) with (ig, st).
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Then, as the identification strategy described above suggests, the import demand elastic-
ity σ and the foreign (inverse) export supply elasticity ω∗ can be consistently estimated by
instrumenting the duty-inclusive price ∆ ln pigt and imports ∆ lnmigt with the tariff ∆ ln τigt
in the two equations (28) and (29), respectively.
The estimation results are reported in Table 3. Columns (1) to (4) report the reduced-
form regressions of the four key outcomes, the import value, the import quantity, the before-
duty price and the duty-inclusive price on the tariff changes ∆ ln(1 + τigt) due to the trade
war. Column (5) reports the IV regression estimation of foreign (inverse) export supply
elasticity ω̂∗ based on equation (29), with its first stage in Column (2). Column (6) reports
the IV regression estimation of import demand elasticity σ̂ based on equation (28), with its
first stage in Column (4).
Columns (1) and (2) show that the import value (before-duty) and quantity decrease
significantly with the tariff increase. The elasticities of these two outcomes in response to
tariff changes are very similar in magnitude. The result in Column (3) indicates that the
before-duty unit values do not respond to import tariff changes, suggesting a complete pass-
through of tariffs to duty-inclusive prices. This is consistent with the result in Column (4),
where the duty-inclusive unit value responds to tariff with elasticity close to one.2
The IV estimate of ω∗ in Column (5) is statistically insignificant and numerically negligi-
ble. This implies that we cannot reject a horizontal foreign export supply curve, consistent
with the finding of a complete pass-through of tariffs in the reduced-form regressions. Col-
umn (6) reports the IV estimation of import demand elasticity σ, statistically significant at
σ̂ = 1.120 (std. err. = 0.3158). We can use the variety-level import demand and export
supply equations (28) and (29) to impute the average change in import values of the target
varieties, given the elasticity estimates:
∆ ln
(
p∗igtmigt
)
= −σ̂ 1 + ω̂
∗
1 + ω̂∗σ̂
∆ ln (1 + τigt) = 1.68%.
The above calculation includes both increase in tariffs against the U.S. products and MFN
tariff cuts on non-U.S. MFN sources of imports. If we considered only China’s retaliation
tariffs against the U.S. products, the average change in import value would be negative at
−17.76%, as reported in Table A.1. The MFN tariff cuts in response to the tariff war thus
cushion the drop in imports from the U.S. substantially.
2Since we measure the duty-inclusive price as the product of duty-exclusive price and the tariff factor:
pigt ≡ p∗igt(1 + τigt), the estimate in Column (4), by construction, equals one plus the estimate in Column
(3), subject to sample attrition across the two estimations.
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4.2 Demand elasticity across products (η)
By adding a time subscript, taking the log-difference over time of equation (11), we obtain:
∆ ln sMgt = ψst + (1− η)∆ ln pMgt + εMgt, (30)
where sMgt ≡ pMgtmgtPMstMst is the import share of product g in sector s, ψst ≡ −(1− η)∆ lnPMst
is a sector-time fixed effect controlling for the sector-level price index of imports, and the
residual term εMgt captures the product-level import demand shock ∆ ln aMgt and other
unobservables.
The import share of each product is observed in the data. We construct the product-level
import price index from variety-level prices as in Feenstra (1994), which accounts for entry
and exit of varieties in two successive periods:
∆ ln pMgt =
1
1− σ
ln
∑
i∈Cgt
sigte
(1−σ)∆ ln(p∗igt(1+τigt))+∆ ln aigt
− 1
1− σ
ln
(
Sg,t (Cgt)
Sg,t−1 (Cgt)
)
, (31)
where sigt ≡ pigtmigt∑
i′∈Cgt
pi′gtmi′gt
is the share of continuing imported variety from country i in all
continuing imported varieties at period t, Cgt is the set of continuing imported varieties in
product g between periods t−1 and t, and Sg,t(C) ≡
∑
i′∈C pi′gtmi′gt∑
i′∈It
pi′gtmi′gt
is the share of continuing
imported value in total imported value of good g at time t. The first term in equation (31)
corresponds to the conventional price index for the set Cgt of continuing imported varieties.
The second term adjusts the price index for the effect of new and exited varieties.3 In the
construction of the product-level price index, we use the estimated σ from equation (28) and
the residuals (which reflect mean-zero demand shocks ∆ ln aigt) from Section 4.1.
Applying the same logic as in the estimation of variety-level elasticities σ and ω∗, we
use product-level tariff changes as instruments for ∆ ln pMgt. We construct the instrumental
variable by the simple average (instead of import-value weighted average) of the tariff changes
across the continuing imported varieties:4
∆ lnZMgt ≡ ln
(
1 + τigt
1 + τig,t−1
)
= ln
 1
N cgt
∑
i∈Cgt
e∆ ln(1+τigt)
 , (32)
where N cgt is the number of continuing imported varieties in product g between t− 1 and t.
3Equation (31) can be derived from the product-level import price index in equation (8) and the variety
demand equation (12).
4As argued by Fajgelbaum et al. (2020), this avoids mechanical correlation of the instrument with the
product-level trade share.
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Table 4 presents the estimation results of equation (30). Column (1) shows the impact
of the instrument on the product-level trade share: higher product-level tariffs lower the
share of the targeted products. This implies that diversion to non-U.S. import sources is
less than sufficient to offset the decrease in imports from the U.S. within the same product
category. Column (2) provides the first-stage result of the IV regression of (30): the sign
of the coefficient is positive as expected, since the product-level price index is aggregated
from duty-inclusive variety prices. Column (3) reports the IV estimate of the coefficient
of the product-level import demand equation (30), which implies an elasticity estimate of
η̂ = 1.087. The bootstrapped confidence interval for η, which accounts for the variance
of σ̂ and the demand shocks from the previous step in Section 4.1, is [1.041,1.131]. Using
the elasticity estimate η̂ and the average change in product-level import tariffs, the average
change in import values for targeted products can be computed as:
∆ ln (pMgtmgt) = (1− η̂) ∆ lnZMgt = 0.01%.
If we considered the partial effects of China’s retaliatory tariffs against the U.S. products
(but not the MFN tariff cuts), the average change in import value would be larger at −1.38%,
as indicated in Table A.1.
4.3 Demand elasticity across domestic and foreign goods (κ)
We further estimate the top-tier elasticity of substitution, κ, between domestic and foreign
goods within a sector. The ratio of the expenditures on foreign goods (10) and domestic
goods (9) implies that:
∆ ln
(
PMstMst
PDstDst
)
= ψs + ψt + (1− κ)∆ ln
(
PMst
PDst
)
+ εst, (33)
where ψs and ψt denote sector and time fixed effects, respectively. The residual εst captures
the relative demand shocks to foreign and domestic goods. The monthly change in the
expenditures on domestic goods of sector s, ∆ lnPDstDst, is not observable in the data.
We use the difference between the changes in the sectoral production and exports as its
proxy. The change in domestic sectoral price index, ∆ lnPDst, is assumed to be equal to the
change in producer price index (PPI), ∆ ln pst. The change in sectoral price index of imports
∆ lnPMst is built in a similar way as in the construction of the product-level import price
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index ∆ ln pMgt:
∆ lnPMst =
1
1− η
ln
(∑
g∈Cst
sgte
(1−η)∆ ln pMgt+∆ ln(aMgt)
)
− 1
1− η
ln
(
Ss,t (Cst)
Ss,t−1 (Cst)
)
, (34)
where sgt is the share of continuing imported product g in all continuing imported products
in sector s, Cst is the set of continuing imported products in sector s between periods t− 1
and t, and Ss,t(C) is the share of products in the set C in total imported value of sector s
at time t.5 We use the estimates of η and ∆ ln aMgt from the product-level estimation in
Section 4.2.
We instrument for the relative price of imports ∆ ln PMst
PDst
using the simple average of tariff
changes across the continuing imported products in sector s:
∆ lnZMst ≡ ln
(
1
N cst
∑
g∈Cst
e∆ lnZMgt
)
, (35)
where N cst is the number of continuing imported products in sector s between t − 1 and t,
and ∆ lnZMgt is the instrument defined in (32).
The estimation results are summarized in Table 5. Column (1) reports the estimated
impact of the average sector-level import tariff changes on the sectoral relative import ex-
penditures. Columns (2) and (3) report the first and second stages of the IV estimation
of (33), respectively. The estimated coefficients of the two reduced-form specifications in
Columns (1) and (2) have the expected signs, but are imprecisely estimated. The IV esti-
mate in Column (3) implies a statistically significant κ̂ = 1.173 (std. err. = 0.3208). The
bootstrapped confidence interval for κ̂, which takes into account the estimated {σ̂, η̂} and
demand shocks from the previous stages, is [0.541,1.385]. Using the sector-level elasticity es-
timate, we can impute the average change in the relative import expenditures due to China’s
import tariff changes as:
∆ ln
(
PMstMst
PDstDst
)
= (1− κ̂) ∆ lnZMst = 0.01%.
Table A.1 indicates that the impact due to the tariff increase on U.S. products alone on the
sector-level import expenditure share would be −2.69% instead.
5That is, sgt ≡ pMgtmgt∑
g′∈Cst
pMg′tmg′t
, and Ss,t(C) ≡
∑
g′∈C pMg′tmg′t∑
g′∈Gt
pMg′tmg′t
.
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4.4 Foreign import demand and Chinese export supply elasticities
at variety level (σ∗, ω)
The foreign import demand and Chinese export supply at the variety level are estimated in
a similar way as in Section 4.1. Taking log changes of the foreign import demand equation
(16) across time, we have:
∆ lnxigt = ψ
x
ig + ψ
x
st − σ∗∆ ln
((
1 + τ ∗igt
)
pXigt
)
+ εxigt, (36)
where we have used the product-destination and sector-time FE to control for the log change
of the foreign demand shifter. Because the increase in foreign tariffs against China is only
implemented by the U.S., it limits the set of FE we can include compared with Fajgelbaum
et al. (2020). Assuming the export supply of China has a symmetric structure with the
foreign export supply, that is, pXig = zigx
ω
ig, we have:
∆ ln pXigt = ψ
pX
ig + ψ
pX
st + ω∆ lnxigt + ε
pX
igt , (37)
where ω is the inverse export supply elasticity of China, after controlling for the fixed effects.
By analogous arguments as in Section 4.1, we use the variation in foreign tariffs due to the
trade war (with nonzero observations only for ig corresponding to the U.S. destination) as
instruments for the independent variables in the above two equations to identify σ∗ and ω.
Table 6 reports the estimation results. The pattern of these estimates is quite similar to
those of σ and ω∗ in Table 3: Columns (1) and (2) show that the export value and quantity
fell with the tariff increases implemented by the U.S., and Columns (3) and (4) imply that
Chinese exporters do not change their price; the incidence of the U.S. tariff increases is largely
borne by U.S. buyers of imports. Column (5) reports the IV estimate of ω with its first stage
in Column (2). The estimate (ω̂ = 0.083) is statistically insignificant, consistent with the
reduced-form result that the U.S. faced a horizontal Chinese export supply curve. Column
(6) reports the IV estimate of equation (36) with its first stage in Column (4). It implies
that σ̂∗ = 0.379 (std. err. = 0.1143). The bootstrapped confidence interval is [0.142,0.608].
The estimates are on the low side, mostly due to the limited variations across destination
countries in tariff changes faced by China.
Given the elasticity estimate and an average increase in U.S. tariffs of 23% on targeted
products, the average change in Chinese export values across targeted products is:
∆ ln
(
pXigtxigt
)
= −σ̂∗∆ ln
(
1 + τ ∗igt
)
= −9%.
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Table A.1 provides the summary of the partial effect estimates of the tariff war on Chinese
imports and exports.
4.5 Pre-trend test
The identification of the import demand and export supply system using a single tariff change
variable as the instrument requires the tariff variation to be uncorrelated with the demand
and supply shocks. In this section, we verify the validity of this condition. We show that the
import tariff changes due to the trade war (the 18 events listed in Table 1) are uncorrelated
with the prewar trends of the import and export outcomes in terms of: values, quantities,
before-duty prices and duty-inclusive prices.
We compute the average monthly change of these outcome variables during 2017:1–
2017:12, and regress them against the latest revised tariff change for each variety during
the period of 2018:1–2019:12:
∆ ln yig,2017 = FE + β∆ ln (1 + τig) + εig. (38)
We conduct the test separately for the three sets of events—China’s retaliatory tariff changes
against the U.S., China’s tariff cuts on non-U.S. MFN sources of imports, and U.S. tariff
increases against Chinese products—with suitable sets of fixed effects given the dimension(s)
of the tariff changes. The results are summarized in Table 7.
Panel A1 shows the pretrend test where we consider China’s retaliatory tariff increase
against U.S. products. Since all targeted varieties are U.S. products and there are no varia-
tions across countries in this case, only the sector fixed effects are controlled for. The results
indicate that all pre-war Chinese import outcome variables (with respect to the U.S. as the
source of imports) are uncorrelated with the subsequent tariff increase China imposed against
the U.S. products. Panel A2 reports the pre-trend test for China’s MFN tariff cuts during
the trade war. We control for country-sector and product fixed effects in this case, since
MFN tariff cuts do not apply to all non-U.S. sources of imports (e.g., they are not applicable
to FTA trading partners of China). We do not observe statistically significant correlations
between pre-war Chinese imports from these MFN sources and China’s subsequent MFN
tariff cuts during the trade war. Finally, in Panel B, we conduct the pre-rend test for the
U.S. tariff increase against Chinese products. For the same reason as in Panel A1, we include
only sector fixed effect. The estimated coefficients are statistically insignificant, suggesting
that the prewar export trends of Chinese products are not systematically correlated with
subsequent increases in the U.S. tariff against China during the trade war.
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5 Welfare Analysis
The impacts of tariff shocks on the Chinese economy are evaluated based on first-order ap-
proximations of the general-equilibrium structure set up in Section 3 around the pre-war equi-
librium in 2017. Letting x̂ ≡ d lnx, the system characterizes the change in each endogenous
variable {ŵsr, ŵTr , ŵNTr , p̂s, φ̂s, L̂Tr , P̂s, P̂Ms, p̂Mg, p̂ig, R̂, Ês, X̂, Ŷ , P̂sIs, p̂sQs, X̂r}, given shocks
to Chinese and foreign tariffs, {dτig, dτ ∗ig}. The details are provided in Appendix B. The
numerical implementation is carried out by solving the linear system (B.1)–(B.4), (B.7)–
(B.11), (B.14), (B.18)–(B.23), and (B.24) in the reduced-form of x̂ = A−1ŷ, where x̂ is a
column vector including all the endogenous variables, y is a column vector with functions of
the given tariff shocks, and A collects elasticities (σ, σ∗, ω∗, η, κ) estimated in Section 4, the
preference and technology parameters(βNT , βs, αLs, αIs, α
s′
s ), distribution of sales and em-
ployment across sectors and provinces, and imports and exports across varieties. We use
the 2017 Chinese input-output (IO) tables, the China Labor Statistical Yearbook of 2017,
and the Chinese customs data for 2017, as documented in Section A, to parameterize the
allocation shares. As a result, we match the model to 2017 data on economic activity for 31
Chinese provinces, 39 tradable sectors (at GB/T-2 digit codes), 119 trade partners, 5,385
imported HS-8 products, 128,778 imported varieties (unique product-country origin), 5,448
exported products, and 378,430 unique product-destination countries. The shocks to the
Chinese and U.S. tariffs, {dτig, dτ ∗ig}, are measured by the latest revised tariff change for
each variety observed during the period 2018:1–2019:12.
5.1 Aggregate Effects
Given the tariff shocks to the pre-war equilibrium in 2017, and the changes in the endogenous
variables calculated from the system described above, the welfare impact for each primary
factor (capital and labor) can be measured as the change in income at initial prices (before
the tariff war) that would have left that factor indifferent to the changes in tariffs that took
place. Adding up the equivalent variations across all primary factors (capital and labor
in each province) gives the aggregate equivalent variation EV , or change in aggregate real
income. This term can be shown to be a function of initial trade flows and price and revenue
changes (following Dixit and Norman, 1980):
EV = −
∑
s
∑
g∈Gs
∑
i
mig∆pig︸ ︷︷ ︸
EVM
+
∑
s
∑
g∈Gs
∑
i
xig∆p
X
ig︸ ︷︷ ︸
EV X
+∆R, (39)
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where EV M is the increase in the duty-inclusive cost of the prewar import basket, EV X is
the increase in the value of the prewar export basket, and ∆R is the change in tariff revenue.
Table 8 reports the decomposition by EV X , EV M , and tariff revenue (∆R) in columns
(1)–(3) and the aggregate impacts in column (4). The top panel reports the effects from the
2018–2019 trade war. The bottom two panels study the alternative hypothetical scenarios
if China had not implemented MFN tariff cuts in response to tariff increases against the
U.S. during the 2018–2019 trade war, and if China had not retaliated against the U.S. or
implemented MFN tariff cuts as a result of the retaliation. Each panel reports the monetary
equivalent on an annual basis at 2017 prices in billions of US$, and the numbers relative to
2017 GDP of China. The point estimates are calculated using the model elasticities estimated
in Section 4, {σ̂ = 1.120, η̂ = 1.087, κ̂ = 1.173, ω̂∗ = −0.008, σ̂∗ = 0.379}, and bootstrapped
confidence intervals are computed for each component using 1,000 bootstrapped parameter
estimates.
The first column shows a decrease of EV X of $17.093 billion (0.141% of China’s GDP)
due to the trade war. This aggregate number equals a model-implied 1.3% decrease in the
export price index times a 10.82% observed share of exports of agricultural and industrial
sectors in GDP. This implies that the diversion of demand away from China’s products
(due to higher U.S. tariffs against China and due to China’s lower MFN tariffs on non-U.S.
imports) dominates potential reallocation toward Chinese products (in response to China’s
higher tariffs against U.S. products). The drop in the export price indices and the decrease
of EV X would have been less at $11.629 billion (0.096% of GDP) if China had not lowered
its MFN tariffs on non-U.S. imports during the trade war. On the other hand, the decrease
in the export price index would have been more severe if China had not retaliated against
the U.S. (and changed its MFN tariffs accordingly). This scenario corresponds to a decrease
of EV X of $27.029 billion (0.223% of GDP). The above estimates of EV X are however noisy
with confidence intervals that include zero, except in the last scenario when there were no
counter retaliations and MFN response from China; in this case, the decrease in EV X is
statistically negative.
The next column shows that Chinese buyers of imports sustained an aggregate loss of
$8.132 billion (0.067% of GDP) because of the trade war. The loss would have been larger at
$11.772 billion (0.097% of GDP) if the Chinese government had not lowered MFN tariffs on
non-U.S. imports when it increased tariffs against U.S. products. Both of these estimates are
statistically significant at 90% confidence intervals. The loss of buyers of imports would, on
the other hand, have been negligible and statistically insignificant at $0.289 billion (0.002%
of GDP) if China had not counter-responded to the U.S. tariff hike. This is consistent with
our finding of a foreign supply elasticity ω∗ being very close to zero, so import price changes
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that consumers face reflect mainly import tariff changes, which in the last scenarios are nil.
The final component of the decomposition implies an increase in tariff revenue of $3.589
billion (0.030% of GDP). The tariff revenue increase would have nearly doubled at $7.145
(0.059% of GDP)—with the increase in tariffs against the U.S.—if China had not also lowered
MFN tariffs on non-U.S. imports. Both of these estimates are statistically significant. In the
third scenario without counter-retaliation by China, the tariff revenue is shown to decrease,
reflecting a decrease in import volume due to general equilibrium effects of U.S. tariffs on
the Chinese economy.
In sum, these numbers imply large negative consequences of the trade war on both Chinese
producers and consumers, dominating the positive tariff revenue increase. The loss of the
producers (exporters) is approximately double the loss of the buyers of imports. Column (4)
suggests an aggregate loss of $21.636 billion, or 0.178% of China’s GDP, as a result of the
trade war. Without the counter-retaliation, the loss would have been much larger at $28.491
billion (0.235% of GDP), and mostly borne by the producers (exporters). The retaliation
against the U.S. imports shifted the burden to the Chinese buyers of imports such that
producers (exporters) and buyers (importers) sustained about the same magnitude of loss.
With further adjustment in the MFN tariff rates on non-U.S. imports, this lessened the loss
of Chinese buyers of imports and shifted part of the burden back to the producers. Overall,
the aggregate loss in EV is not significant statistically due to the large estimation errors
around EV X , except in the third scenario. Although we cannot reject the null hypothesis
that the aggregate losses are zero, both EV M and ∆R are precisely estimated and we can
conclude that the Chinese consumer losses from the trade war were large.
5.2 Regional Effects
We now examine the distributional impacts of the trade war across Chinese provinces. Tariffs
negatively affect buyers of imports for final demand and for intermediate use. The costs of
intermediate inputs could increase more in provinces whose production is more concentrated
in sectors that use proportionally more inputs targeted by Chinese tariff increases. Workers
could also be more negatively affected in regions whose production is more concentrated in
sectors targeted by the U.S. tariffs (through changes in the producer and export prices), less
protected by China’s retaliatory tariffs against the U.S., or subject to China’s MFN tariff
reductions.
Figure 2 illustrates the variation in exposure to the trade war across provinces in China:
(A) with respect to China’s tariff increases on U.S. products; (B) with respect to China’s
MFN tariff cuts; (C) the combination of the first two; and (D) with respect to the U.S.
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tariff increases on Chinese products. We construct the province-level exposure of tradable
sectors by first computing the trade-weighted tariff changes by GB/T-2 sector and then
mapping them to provinces based on provinces’ employment structure. In particular, the
tariff shock at the sector level is computed as the trade-weighted average of the variety-
level tariff changes using the 2017 trade shares. The province-level tariff shocks are then
constructed as the labor-compensation weighted average of the sector-level tariff shocks.6
Figure 2 suggests that China tended to: (A) retaliate against the U.S. in sectors with
a relatively high concentration in the outlying provinces such as Xinjiang, Hainan, and
Heilongjiang; and (B) reduce MFN tariffs on sectors concentrated in provinces closer to the
coast such as Shanghai and Beijing. Overall, China’s tariff increases tended to be biased
toward inner provinces and turn negative in the Eastern provinces. Added to the burden,
Panel (D) suggests that these provinces also faced higher tariff increase on their exports to
the U.S.
Figure 3 shows the effects of the trade war on real wage across provinces. The first map
(A) shows the province-level reduction in real wages in tradable sectors due to the trade war,
and the second map (B) shows real wage losses in the hypothetical scenario where China had
not reduced MFN tariffs on non-U.S. imports. Every province experienced a reduction in the
tradable real wage. Provinces with larger relative losses are concentrated in the Southeast,
whose employment structures were hit more strongly by the U.S. tariff increase. Map (B)
suggests that the real wage losses would have been one level higher without the MFN tariff
cuts by China. This contrasts with the finding in Table 8, where the MFN tariff cuts by
China worsen the aggregate loss. This implies that the MFN tariff cuts help cushion the
impacts on workers/consumers via lower import prices, at the cost of producers (and the
owners of capital and fixed structures), who face steeper competition in the product market.
Overall, on average across provinces, the nominal wages for workers in tradable sectors
decreased by 1.69% (std. dev. = 0.06%). These income losses were however cushioned by a
reduced cost of living, as the CPI of tradable goods decreased by 1.16% on average across
sectors, reflecting an average 0.63% increase in import prices and lower prices of domestic
goods (-1.38%). As a result, real wages in the tradable sector fell by 0.24% (std. dev. =
0.03%).
6The exposure of region r to the Chinese import tariff changes is ∆τr =∑
s∈S
(
wsrLsr
wTrLTr
) ∑
g∈Gs
∑
i∈I p
∗
igmig∆τig∑
g′∈Gs
∑
i′∈I p
∗
i′g′mi′g′
, and the exposure to the U.S. tariff changes is ∆τ∗r =∑
s∈S
(
wsrLsr
wTrLTr
) ∑
g∈Gs
∑
i∈I p
X
igxig∆τ
∗
ig∑
g′∈Gs
∑
i′∈I p
X
i′g′xi′g′
, where wTr L
T
r are total tradable sector wages in province r.
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5.3 Trade Diversion Effects
In this section, we report the model-implied trade diversion effects of the trade war. Details
are documented in Appendix B.3. Table 9 summarizes the diversion of Chinese imports and
exports due to the trade war. As China increased tariffs on U.S. products and decreased
MFN tariffs on other trading partners, Chinese imports were diverted from U.S. toward non-
U.S. sources. The share of imports from the U.S. dropped from 9.09% to 8.17%. Chinese
imports were mainly diverted toward countries in Asia and Europe. Although China reduced
imports from all sources due to general-equilibrium effects, the drop was proportionally less
with respect to countries in Europe. On the other hand, facing the U.S. tariff increase, China
diverted its exports toward the other markets. The share of exports to the U.S. declined from
19.21% to 18.11%. In particular, its exports to all destinations decreased but proportionally
less so with respect to countries in Asia. Thus, as a result of the trade war, China tilted
its sources of inputs toward countries in Europe (19.17% to 19.50%), while relying more on
countries in Asia as its markets (48.64% to 49.38%).
6 Conclusion
The U.S.-China tariff war escalated in a short span of 24 months during 2018:1–2019:12 before
the Phase One Deal was reached in 2019:12. This paper provides an ex post analysis of the
micro and macro responses of the Chinese economy to the tariff shocks of 2018:1–2019:12.
This complements the studies by Amiti, Redding and Weinstein (2019), Fajgelbaum et al.
(2020), and Cavallo et al. (2020) for the U.S. economy.
In the first step, we use monthly variations during 2018:1–2019:12 in Chinese imports and
exports of HS-8 digit products by source and destination countries to identify the elasticities
of the economy’s import demand and export supply at the product-country (i.e., variety)
level. The identification relies on monthly variations in tariff rates that are uncorrelated with
the unobserved demand and supply shocks of the corresponding variety. The tariff shocks
associated with the tariff war are taken as the ideal instrument given its unprecedented and
unpredictable nature. The validity of the instrument was verified with pre-trend tests. The
resulting elasticity estimates provide a first view of the direct effects of the tariff war on
Chinese imports and exports at the variety, product, and sector level.
In the second step, the estimated demand structure is embedded in a general equilibrium
model with a supply-side structure calibrated to the Chinese economy. In particular, goods
markets (for final demand and intermediate use) are integrated across Chinese provinces
but primary inputs (labor and specific factors) are confined to their current sector-province
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of employment in the short run. The tariff shocks to the demand for Chinese and foreign
varieties in the local and U.S. markets trickle ‘up’ the 3-tier demand system, and affect
the Chinese producer prices across sectors and the real wages across sector-provinces. The
exposure of a sector-province to the tariff war depends on the sector’s exposure to the tariff
shocks and a province’s production structure across sectors.
The tariff war imposed a large welfare loss on Chinese producers/exporters (US$ 17.093
billion) and on buyers of imports (US$ 8.132 billion), with a net loss of aggregate welfare
(US$ 21.636 billion) after taking into account the tariff revenue. The Chinese initiative
to lower MFN tariffs as it raised tariffs against the U.S. products led to larger aggregate
welfare losses at the cost of producers, but appeared to be an effective redistributive policy
to cushion the impacts on consumers/workers. The loss of consumers/buyers of imports
would have been higher (US$ 11.772 billion) and the average real wage in tradable sectors
would have dropped by more (0.28% vs. 0.24%) if not for the MFN tariff cuts. The analysis
also indicates that the provinces that are closer to the coast were hit harder (in terms of real
wages in tradable sectors) by the tariff war. This occurred not only because these provinces
were proportionally more specialized in products targeted by the U.S. tariff hike, but also
because the Chinese government tended to lower MFN tariffs on products produced by these
provinces. Finally, due to the tariff war, the Chinese economy reduced its share of imports
from the U.S. (from 9.09% to 8.17%). At the same time, the share of its exports to the U.S.
market dropped from 19.21% to 18.11%. Trade tended to be diverted toward countries in
Europe (as sources of imports) and Asia (as markets for exports).
Some comments are in order. First, similarly to Fajgelbaum et al. (2020), our estimates
suggest horizontal foreign export supply and Chinese export supply curves. Hence, the in-
cidence of import tariffs is borne entirely by the importing country. This implies less policy
room for China to retaliate, as there are no terms-of-trade gains. This might help explain the
moderate increase in Chinese tariff rates for a majority of products included in its targeted
list, and its move to lower MFN tariffs. Second, a potential caveat to the above finding is
the nature of estimation specification, where sector-time fixed effects are controlled for and
changes in import quantities/prices/tariffs are evaluated with monthly frequency. These
are likely to reduce the magnitude of elasticity estimates, if the sector-time fixed effects
used to control for unobservables also absorb a significant source of variations in variety im-
ports/exports or if import responses are not fully manifested at monthly frequency. Third,
the general equilibrium structure used has a high resolution with respect to modeling of
product markets for the local economy. It covers for the Chinese economy, e.g., 5,385 im-
ported HS-8 products, and 128,778 imported varieties (unique product-country origin); and
5,448 exported products, and 378,430 unique product-destination countries. It, however, has
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a very simple structure for the rest of the world, and thus cannot accommodate general equi-
librium adjustment across countries. For example, it cannot address the repercussion of the
trade war on the regional or global value chain in which China plays a critical role. Fourth,
the model used is static in nature, and thus cannot address the potential impacts in the long
run due to factor reallocations across sectors and regions. We leave these generalizations to
future research.
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A Data Appendix
A.1 Definitions
Products, varieties and sectors are defined as follows in the analysis:
• Products are defined at the Harmonized System 8-digit level (denoted as HS-8). For
example, the HS 8-digit code 40131000 covers the product “inner tubes of rubber used
on motor cars.”
• Varieties are defined at the product-country level. For example, imports (exports) of
“inner tubes of rubber used on motor cars” from (to) the US are a distinct variety.
• Sectors are defined according to the China Industry Classification system (GB/T 4754)
at the 2-digit level (denoted as GB/T-2). For example, the GB/T-2 code 29 covers
“manufacture of rubber and plastics products.”
A.2 Variety-level Data on Trade and Tariffs
The variety-level data on Chinese imports and Chinese tariffs are used to identify the Chinese
import demand and foreign export supply elasticities (σ, ω∗) at the variety level. Similarly,
the variety-level data on Chinese exports and foreign tariffs against Chinese products are
used to identify the foreign import demand and Chinese export supply elasticities (σ∗, ω) at
the variety level.
A.2.1 Trade Data
We obtain China’s trade data in monthly frequency for the period 2017:1–2019:12 from the
General Administration of Customs, China.7 We observe the Chinese imports and exports
at the HS-8 digit level by the source of imports and the destination of exports (i.e., at
the variety level). For each variety, the customs data report the quantities of imports and
exports, the value of imports at the CIF price, and the value of exports at the FOB price.
The import and export values are reported in current USD values.
A.2.2 Tariff Data
Our tariff data comprise of two main components, the baseline tariff rates applied to Chinese
imports and exports, and tariff changes associated with the US-China trade war. For the
Chinese baseline tariff rates, we downloaded the annual tariff schedule of China from the
7http://www.customs.gov.cn/
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UN TRAINS database via the World Integrated Trade Solution (WITS).8 Given the tariff
rates available at the HS-10 level, we assume that the most-favored-nation (MFN) rate is
applied to the WTO members, the preferential rate to trading partners with which China
has any preferential trade agreement (PTA) in place, and the general duty rate (GDR) to
the rest of the world. We then take the simple average of the HS-10 level tariff rates as
the HS-8 level tariff rate. This aggregation is due to the fact that the tariff rate changes
(or tariff rates in general) published by the Chinese Ministry of Finance are only available
at the HS-8 level.9 We cross-check, correct and supplement the missing values of the data
obtained from TRAINS with the annual tariff schedules released by the Ministry of Finance.
After constructing the baseline import tariff rate for January 2017, we then update the rates
in monthly frequency, given the official announcement by the Ministry of Finance of any
tariff changes (tariff increases against the U.S. or MFN tariff cuts against the other WTO
members).10 These tariff changes are specified at the HS-8 level.11
For tariffs faced by the Chinese exports, we compile the annual tariff rates imposed by
Chinese trading partners from the UN TRAINS database.12. In particular, we use the simple
average of Effectively Applied (AHS) tariff rates by Chinese trading partners against China.
These are available at the HS-6 digit level. For tariff changes associated with the trade war,
we obtain that part of information from Fajgelbaum et al. (2019) (for tariff changes in 2018)
and the Office of the United States Trade Representative (USTR)13 (for tariff changes in
2019). The tariff changes are aggregated from the HS-10 to the HS-6 level based on simple
average. The use of the HS-6 digit for tariffs faced by Chinese exports is because the HS
codes are only harmonized across countries up to the level of HS-6 codes. The estimations
of trade elasticities for Chinese exports are nonetheless conducted at the HS-8 level of trade
(with the HS-6 tariffs assigned to all HS-8 products in the category). Thus, the same caveat
noted by Fajgelbaum et al. (2020) applies, that we may overestimate the value of Chinese
exports subject to tariffs and underestimate the foreign import demand elasticity.
8http://wits.worldbank.org/WITS/WITS/QuickQuery/Tariff-ViewAndExportRawData/
TariffViewAndExportRawData.aspx?Page=TariffViewAndExportRawData
9http://gss.mof.gov.cn/zhengwuxinxi/zhengcefabu/index_3.html
10http://gss.mof.gov.cn/zhengwuxinxi/zhengcefabu/index_3.html
11Beside the tariff changes associated with the trade war, in constructing the applied tariff rates we also
record other tariff revisions. These include annual MFN rate adjustments (normally twice in a year, in
January and July), tariff reductions resulting from longstanding treaty commitments, new PTAs signed
between China and its trading partners, or the removal of import tariff barriers for certain products due
to its 13th Five-Year Plan for National Economic and Social Development. These other tariff revisions are
used to construct a more precise measure of the applied tariff rate. Their variations, however, are not used
in the construction of instrumental variables, i.e., not as sources of identification of the elasticities.
12http://wits.worldbank.org/WITS/WITS/AdvanceQuery/TariffAndTradeAnalysis/
AdvancedQueryDefinition.aspx?Page=TariffandTradeAnalysis
13https://ustr.gov/
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Following Fajgelbaum et al. (2020), we scale tariff increases by the number of days of the
month they were in effect. For example, a 15 p.p. tariff increase enacted on the 20th day of
a 30-day month is assigned a 5 p.p. tariff increase (15 * 10/30 = 5) in the initial month, and
an additional 10 p.p. increase in the subsequent month.
A.3 Sector-level Data
The sector-level price and output data are used to identify the elasticity of substitution (κ)
between domestic and imported goods at the sector level. The input-output (IO) table is
used in the general equilibrium analysis of welfare effects. We classify sectors using the China
Industry Classification system (GB/T 4754), which is widely used in the collection of official
statistics on companies and organizations throughout Mainland China. The sector-level data
at the GB/T 2-digit level (denoted GB/T-2) are obtained from China’s National Bureau of
Statistics.14 The classification includes 97 sectors in total, and 43 sectors in agriculture,
mining and manufacturing.
1. Measure of 4 lnPDst: The change in the price index of domestically produced goods
is proxied by the change in the producer price index. The producer price index for
industrial products (PPI) is available with monthly frequency for 40 industrial sectors.
2. Measure of 4 ln(PDstDst): The monthly change in expenditures on domestically pro-
duced goods is measured as the difference between the changes in sectoral production
and exports. The data on the sectoral output (quantity) are available with monthly
frequency but only for major products in 27 manufacturing sectors. We normalize the
output of each product relative to 2016:1, and use the simple average across products
within each sector as the sectoral production index.15 The export quantity is con-
structed as the ratio of export values and the producer price index. The estimations of
the elasticity κ are thus based on a subset of industrial sectors where the above data
are available.
3. The input-output (IO) tables are compiled for 2017. These tables quantify annual
inputs and outputs of commodities by intermediate and final users in 2017, for 88
sectors.
For the analysis in the paper, we classify GB/T-2 sectors as tradable if they are matched
to an HS-6 code in the trade data. For the cross-walk between GB/T sectors and HS
14http://www.stats.gov.cn/
15The methodology of constructing the production index usually requires the industrial value-added of
each product to be used as the weight in calculating the index, but such data are not available. Thus, in our
calculation, we take the weight to be equal across the major products.
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products, we use the conversion table of Sheng (2002) (available for 36 industrial sectors),
and the concordance tables from WITS (ISIC-HS)16 and from China’s National Bureau of
Statistics (ISIC-GB/T)17 (available for all economic activities). Minor modifications are
further made where a product is mapped to more than one sector, using our interpretations
of the official descriptions of the products and sectors. There are a total of 39 tradable
sectors.
A.4 Province-level Data
For the general equilibrium analysis, we collect the annual employment and wage data at the
sector and province level from the China Labor Statistical Yearbook of 2017. It records the
employment and total wages of urban units by sector and region. These are available for 31
provinces and 94 GB/T-2 sectors (covering services, agriculture, mining and manufacturing
sectors). All of the 39 tradable sectors are covered individually in both the IO tables and the
labor statistics dataset. We aggregate the remaining sectors as a single non-tradable sector,
thus reconciling the IO tables and the labor statistics dataset.
B Appendix to Section 5 (Welfare Analysis)
The general-equilibrium (GE) system is fully characterized in Fajgelbaum et al. (2020).
We provide the derivations in Section B.1 for ease of reference (correcting some typos of
the original paper along the way), and document the details of the implementations in the
context of China in Sections B.2. Section B.3 describes how we evaluate the trade diversion
impact given shocks to the system.
B.1 General Equilibrium System of Changes
The model solution is derived as a system of first-order approximations around an initial
equilibrium corresponding to the period before the trade war. Every market clearing condi-
tion is expressed in log-changes. The outcome depends on endogenous variables, observed
initial shares, elasticities and tariff shocks. Letting x̂ ≡ d lnx, the system describes the log-
change of each endogenous variable given shocks to Chinese and foreign tariffs, {dτig, dτ ∗ig}.
Using market clearing conditions, the solution of the model can be expressed as a system for
the changes in wages per efficiency unit {ŵsr}, average wages in the traded sectors {ŵTr },
wages in the non-tradable sector {ŵNTr }, producer prices {p̂s}, intermediate input prices
16https://192.86.102.134/product_concordance.html
17http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjsj/tjbz/hyflbz/201710/t20171012_1541679.html
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{φ̂s}, employment in the tradable sector {L̂Tr }, sector price indices {P̂s}, sector-level im-
port price indices {P̂Ms}, product-level import price indices {p̂Mg}, duty-inclusive prices
of imported varieties {p̂ig}, tariff revenues R̂, sector-level expenditures {Ês}, national final
consumer expenditures X̂, national value added Ŷ , national intermediate expenditures by
sector {P̂sIs}, national sales by sector {p̂sQs}, and final consumer expenditures by region
{X̂r}.
Wages, Producer Prices, Input Prices, and Tradable Employment
The first set of equations characterizes {ŵsr, ŵTr , ŵNTr , p̂s, φ̂s, L̂Tr }, given {X̂r, Ês, P̂s, τ̂ ∗ig}.
First, by (25), we have:
ŵsr =
1
1− αIs
(
p̂s − αIsφ̂s − αKsL̂sr
)
.
Define χI as an indicator that equals one if labor is immobile across sectors and zero other-
wise. In the case where χI = 1, it follows that:
L̂sr = 0,
ŵsr =
1
1− αIs
(
p̂s − αIsφ̂s
)
,
ŵTr ≡
dwTr
wTr
=
∑
s∈S dwsrLsr∑
s∈S wsrLsr
=
∑
s∈S
wsrLsr
wTr L
T
r
dwsr
wsr
=
∑
s∈S
(
wsrLsr
wTr L
T
r
)
p̂s − αIsφ̂s
1− αIs
.
In the alternative case where χI = 0, we have instead:
wsr = w
T
r ,
ŵsr = ŵ
T
r =
1
1− αIs
(
p̂s − αIsφ̂s − αKsL̂sr
)
,
ŵTr ≡
dwTr
wTr
=
∑
s∈S
wsrLsr
wTr L
T
r
(
dwsr
wsr
+
dLsr
Lsr
− dL
T
r
LTr
)
,
L̂Tr ≡
dLTr
LTr
=
∑
s∈S dLsr
LTr
=
∑
s∈S
Lsr
LTr
dLsr
Lsr
.
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Thus, it follows that:
ŵTr =
∑
s∈S
wsrLsr
wTr L
T
r
(
ŵsr + L̂sr − L̂Tr
)
=
∑
s∈S
wsrLsr
wTr L
T
r
ŵsr +
∑
s∈S
Lsr
LTr
L̂sr − L̂Tr
=
∑
s∈S
wsrLsr
wTr L
T
r
ŵsr
∑
s∈S
(
wsrLsr
wTr L
T
r
)
1− αIs
αKs
ŵTr =
∑
s∈S
(
wsrLsr
wTr L
T
r
)
1
αKs
(
p̂s − αIsφ̂s − αKsL̂sr
)
∑
s∈S
(
wsrLsr
wTr L
T
r
)
1− αIs
αKs
ŵTr =
∑
s∈S
(
wsrLsr
wTr L
T
r
)
p̂s − αIsφ̂s
αKs
− L̂Tr
In sum, we have:
ŵsr = χ
I p̂s − αIsφ̂s
1− αIs
+
(
1− χI
)
ŵTr , (B.1)
ŵTr = χ
I
∑
s∈S
(
wsrLsr
wTr L
T
r
)
p̂s − αIsφ̂s
1− αIs
+
(
1− χI
) ∑s∈S (wsrLsrwTr LTr ) p̂s−αIsφ̂sαKs − L̂Tr∑
s∈S
(
wsrLsr
wTr L
T
r
)
1−αIs
αKs
. (B.2)
Second, by the wage rate for non-tradable sectors (27), we have:
ŵNTr = X̂r − L̂NTr
and by full employment in each region, it follows that:
L̂Tr = −
LNTr
LTr
L̂NTr .
Thus, in sum:
ŵNTr = χ
IX̂r +
(
1− χI
)
ŵTr , (B.3)
L̂Tr =
(
1− χI
) (
ŵTr − X̂r
) LNTr
LTr
(B.4)
Third, note that by the setup, pDg =
ps
zg
; pXig = δig pDg; and (5) holds. It follows that
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p̂Dg = p̂
X
ig = P̂Ds = p̂s. By (22) and (23), we have:
Q̂s =
∑
g∈Gs
dg/zg
Qs
d̂g +
∑
g∈Gs
∑
i∈I
δigxig/zg
Qs
x̂ig,
=
PDsDs
psQs
d̂g +
∑
g∈Gs
∑
i∈I
pXigxig
psQs
x̂ig.
Further, by equations (22), (9) and (16) we have:
d̂g = D̂s = Ês + (κ− 1)P̂s − κp̂s,
x̂ig = −σ∗
(
dτ ∗ig
1 + τ ∗ig
+ p̂s
)
.
It follows that:
Q̂s =
PDsDs
psQs
(
Ês + (κ− 1)P̂s − κp̂s
)
−
∑
g∈Gs
∑
i∈I
pXigxig
psQs
σ∗
(
dτ ∗ig
1 + τ ∗ig
+ p̂s
)
. (B.5)
Further, by (21) and (20), we have:
Q̂s =
∑
r∈R
Qsr
Qs
Q̂sr
=
∑
r∈R
Qsr
Qs
(
1− αKs
αKs
p̂s −
αIs
αKs
φ̂s −
αLs
αKs
ŵsr
)
=
1− αKs
αKs
p̂s −
αIs
αKs
φ̂s −
∑
r∈R
psQsr
psQs
αLs
αKs
ŵsr. (B.6)
Finally, combining (B.5) and (B.6) yields:
p̂s =
PDsDs
psQs
(
Ês + (κ− 1)P̂s
)
+ αIs
αKs
φ̂s +
∑
r∈R
psQsr
psQs
αLs
αKs
ŵsr − σ∗
∑
g∈Gs
∑
i∈I
pXigxig
psQs
dτ∗ig
1+τ∗ig
1−αKs
αKs
+ PDsDs
psQs
κ+
(
1− PDsDs
psQs
)
σ∗
,
(B.7)
where by (18), the change in the price index of intermediates is:
φ̂s =
∑
s′∈S
αs
′
s
αIs
P̂s′ (B.8)
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Consumer Prices, Import Prices, and Tariff Revenue
The second set of equations characterizes {P̂s, P̂Ms, p̂Mg, p̂ig, R̂} given {Ês, dτig}. First, from
(2), the sector price index changes according to a weighted average of producer prices and
the import price index:
P̂s =
PDsDs
Es
p̂s +
(
1− PDsDs
Es
)
P̂Ms. (B.9)
Next, by (6), the import price index in sector s changes according to:
P̂Ms =
∑
g∈Gs
(
pMgmg
PMsMs
)
p̂Mg, (B.10)
and by (8), the product-level import price index changes according to:
p̂Mg =
∑
i∈I
(
pigmig
pMgmg
)
p̂ig. (B.11)
Further, from (12), (11), and (9), we have:
m̂ig = m̂g + σp̂Mg − σp̂ig
= M̂s + ηP̂Ms + (σ − η) p̂Mg − σp̂ig
= Ês + (κ− 1) P̂s + (η − κ) P̂Ms + (σ − η) p̂Mg − σp̂ig. (B.12)
From the foreign export supply (15) and the price relationship (13), we also have:
m̂ig =
1
ω∗
(
p̂ig −
dτig
1 + τig
)
. (B.13)
Combining (B.12) and (B.13), it follows that:
p̂ig =
ω∗
1 + ω∗σ
(
Ês + (κ− 1)P̂s + (η − κ)P̂Ms + (σ − η)p̂Mg
)
+
1
1 + ω∗σ
dτig
1 + τig
(B.14)
Lastly, recall the definition of tariff revenue,
R =
∑
s∈S
∑
g∈Gs
∑
i∈I
τigp
∗
igmig. (B.15)
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Taking the second-order total differentiation gives:
dR =
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∑
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i
(
p∗igmigdτig + τigmigdp
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1
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. (B.16)
It follows that:
R̂ =
∑
s
∑
g∈Gs
∑
i
p∗igmig
R
dτig+
∑
s
∑
g∈Gs
∑
i
p∗igmig
R
(τig + dτig)
(
p̂∗ig + m̂ig
)
+
1
2
∑
s
∑
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∑
i
τig
R
d2
(
p∗igmig
)
(B.17)
We set the last second order term τigd
2
(
p∗igmig
)
to 0, provided that the initial tariffs τig are
reasonably small. Using the solutions for p̂ig and m̂ig from equations (B.14) and (B.13), in
addition to (13), we get:
R̂ =
∑
s
∑
g∈Gs
∑
i
(τig + dτig)
p∗igmig
R
1 + ω∗
1 + ω∗σ
(
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σ
1 + ω∗
1 + ω∗σ
(
dτig
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)2
(B.18)
Sector and Region Demand Shifters
The third set of equations characterizes the sector and region level expenditure shifters
{Ês, X̂r} given {R̂, p̂s, φ̂s, ŵNTr , ŵsr}. The expenditure in sector s is defined as Es = PsCs +
PsIs, and from (14) we have PsCs = βsX, where X is the total national expenditure, defined
as X = Y +R+D, where D is the trade deficit. We assume that the national trade deficit
is determined by factors outside the model and remains unchanged. Thus, it follows that:
Ês ≡
PsCs
Es
X̂ +
(
1− PsCs
Es
)
P̂sIs, (B.19)
X̂ =
Y
X
Ŷ +
R
X
R̂. (B.20)
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Since we assume that the non-tradable sectors only use labor as input, this implies that the
national income equals Y =
∑
r∈R PNT,rQNT,r +
∑
s∈S (1− αIs) psQs. Hence,
Ŷ =
∑
r∈R
(
PNT,rQNT,r
Y
)
X̂r +
∑
s∈S
(1− αIs)
(
psQs
Y
)∑
r∈R
(
psQsr
psQs
)(
p̂s + Q̂sr
)
. (B.21)
The total demand for intermediates of sector s is defined as:
PsIs =
∑
s′∈S
αss′ps′Qs′ ,
so that
P̂sIs =
∑
s′∈S
αss′
∑
r∈R
ps′Qs′r
PsIs
(
p̂s′ + Q̂s′r
)
. (B.22)
Using (20) for Qsr, we have:
p̂s + Q̂sr =
1
αKs
p̂s −
αIs
αKs
φ̂s −
αLs
αKs
ŵsr. (B.23)
By (14), we have PNT,rQNT,r = βNTXr. Thus, using (24), the change of expenditures in
region r can be expressed as:
X̂r =
∑
s∈S
psrQsr
Xr
(1− αIs)
(
p̂s + Q̂sr
)
+ brR
Xr
R̂
1− PNT,rQNT,r
Xr
(B.24)
B.2 Implementation
The numerical implementation is carried out by solving the linear system (B.1)–(B.4), (B.7)–
(B.11), (B.14), (B.18)–(B.23), and (B.24) in the reduced-form of x̂ = A−1ŷ, where x̂ is a
column vector including all the endogenous variables, y is a column vector with functions
of the given tariff shocks (dτig, dτ
∗
ig), and A collects the elasticities (σ, σ
∗, ω∗, η, κ) estimated
in Section 4, the preference and technology parameters(βNT , βs, αLs, αIs, α
s′
s ), distribution of
sales and employment across sectors and provinces, and imports and exports across varieties.
We use the 2017 Chinese input-output (IO) tables, the China Labor Statistical Yearbook
of 2017, and the Chinese customs data for 2017, as documented in Section A, to parameterize
the allocation shares. We basically follow the same steps as in Fajgelbaum et al. (2020) to
construct the shares. Differences in the Chinese context are highlighted below. The share of
expenditures on the non-tradable good is set at βNT = 0.6 such that the model matches the
observed 18% share of imports in GDP. Implementing the system also requires information on
labor income and employment shares by regions. We allocate the sectoral labor compensation
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(from the IO tables) across Chinese provinces using the sector-province labor compensation
shares (from the China Labor Statistical Yearbook of 2017). All 31 provinces have positive
employment in both tradable and non-tradable sectors. Finally, implementing the system
requires information on import and export flows by variety. We allocate the sector-level
import and export flows (from the IO tables) across varieties using the import and export
shares at the variety level within each GB/T-2 sector (observed in the Chinese customs
data).
As a result, we match the model to 2017 data on economic activity for 31 Chinese
provinces, 39 tradable sectors (at GB/T-2 digit codes), 119 trading partners, 5,385 imported
HS-8 products, 128,778 imported varieties (unique product-country origin), 5,448 exported
products, and 378,430 unique product-destination countries. In sum, the vector x̂ includes
664,928 endogenous variables, where 657,932 correspond to the variety prices p̂ig.
B.3 Trade Diversion Impacts
Note that the change in the import from a trading partner i across all products in sector s
is: ∑̂
g∈Gs
p∗igmig =
∑
g∈Gs
(
p∗igmig∑
g∈Gs p
∗
igmg
(p̂∗ig + m̂ig)
)
, (B.25)
and across all tradable sectors is:
̂∑
s∈S
∑
g∈Gs
p∗igmig =
∑
s∈S
∑
g∈Gs
(
p∗igmig∑
s∈S
∑
g∈Gs p
∗
igmig
(p̂∗ig + m̂ig)
)
. (B.26)
Aggregating across trading partners within a set of countries i ∈ Io, the corresponding
expressions are:
̂∑
i∈Io
∑
g∈Gs
p∗igmig =
∑
i∈Io
∑
g∈Gs
(
p∗igmig∑
i∈Io
∑
g∈Gs p
∗
igmig
(p̂∗ig + m̂ig)
)
, (B.27)
̂∑
s∈S
∑
i∈Io
∑
g∈Gs
p∗igmig =
∑
s∈S
∑
i∈Io
∑
g∈Gs
(
p∗igmig∑
s∈S
∑
i∈Io
∑
g∈Gs p
∗
igmig
(p̂∗ig + m̂ig)
)
. (B.28)
Next, using (16), we have:
x̂ig = −σ∗p̂Xig = −σ∗p̂s, for i 6= US;
x̂ig = −σ∗
(
dτ ∗ig
1 + τ ∗ig
+ p̂s
)
, for i = US.
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Thus, for each s ∈ S and i 6= US, the change in export value is:
ÊX−US,s =
̂∑
i 6=US
∑
g∈Gs
pXigxig =
∑
i 6=US
∑
g∈Gs
(
pXigxig∑
i 6=US
∑
g∈Gs p
X
igxig
(p̂Xig + x̂ig)
)
=
∑
i 6=US
∑
g∈Gs
(
pXigxig∑
i 6=US
∑
g∈Gs p
X
igxig
(1− σ∗)p̂s
)
, (B.29)
and similarly for i = US:
ÊXUS,s =
∑̂
g∈Gs
pXigxig =
∑
g∈Gs
(
pXigxig∑
g∈Gs p
X
igxig
(p̂Xig + x̂ig)
)
=
∑
g∈Gs
(
pXigxig∑
g∈Gs p
X
igxig
(
(1− σ∗)p̂s − σ∗
dτ ∗ig
1 + τ ∗ig
))
. (B.30)
The change in export value across all tradable sectors can be similarly aggregated.
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Table 1: Trade War Events during 2018–2019
Event Effective Date Products Trade Value in 2017 Tariff (%)
(# HS-8) (mil US$) (%) before after
Panel A. Tariff increase on Chinese products enacted by U.S.
1 February 7, 2018 12 983 0.04 1.11 31.11
2 March 27, 2018 158 2,868 0.13 7.17 22.99
3 July 6, 2018 957 59,890 2.63 1.38 26.91
4 August 23, 2018 345 19,810 0.87 15.39 34.60
5 September 24, 2018 3829 189,400 8.32 7.56 14.96
6 May 10, 2019 —”— —”— –”– 14.96 29.99
7 September 1, 2019 1859 131,400 5.77 12.59 22.60
Panel B1. China’s retaliatory tariffs on U.S. products
1 April 2, 2018 93 2,970 0.17 11.15 27.75
2 July 6, 2018 267 33,830 1.98 12.81 35.56
3 August 23, 2018 201 14,110 0.83 14.16 32.82
4 September 24, 2018 5190 58,160 3.41 9.91 16.43
5 January 1, 2019 120 14,250 0.83 24.39 13.53
6 June 1, 2019 4545 40,220 2.35 10.3 17.13
7 September 1, 2019 1153 28,670 1.68 9.63 18.47
Panel B2. China’s MFN tariff cuts
8 May 1, 2018 26 13,710 0.8 2.12 0
9 July 1, 2018 151 59,590 3.49 11.03 7.01
10 July 1, 2018 1376 36,030 2.11 13.69 7.01
11 November 1, 2018 1532 59,610 3.49 9.57 7.95
Note: The table reports tariff events implemented by the U.S. (Panel A) and China (Panel B), which are used
as sources of identification in the estimations of demand and supply elasticities in Section 4. In addition to the
retaliation against U.S. products (Panel B1), China also implemented MFN tariff cuts in response (Panel B2).
The columns display: the number of HS-8 products affected; the value of trade affected (in million US$); the
corresponding shares (%) in 2017; and the simple monthly average tariff rates (in percentage points) across
targeted products in the month before and the month after the implementation month (which is taken to be
the current month if the implementation date is before the 15th of the month and the next month otherwise).
The denominator of trade share is the 2017 annual US$ value of total Chinese exports (imports) in Panel A
(Panel B), respectively. See the text for data sources. In Panel A, Event 6 applies to the same set of products
as Event 5 but with an upward revision of the tariff rates.
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Table 2: Sector-Level Tariff Variations
Imports (Chinese tariffs) Exports (U.S. tariffs)
∆ Tariffs ∆ Tariffs
Sector GB/T-2 # Products # Varieties Mean Std. dev. # Products # Varieties Mean Std. dev.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Agricultural Products 1-5 77 121 0.15 0.10 94 94 0.24 0.11
Mining 6-12 126 410 0.09 0.13 71 71 0.21 0.07
Processing of Food from Agricultural Products 13 448 1687 0.07 0.21 371 371 0.21 0.09
Manufacture of Foods 14 174 1564 -0.01 0.15 143 143 0.22 0.09
Manufacture of Liquor, Beverages 15 75 790 -0.03 0.19 74 74 0.13 0.08
Manufacture of Tobacco 16 8 43 0.10 0.14 6 6 0.19 0.13
Manufacture of Textile 17 740 13225 -0.02 0.11 777 777 0.20 0.08
Manufacture of Textile, Wearing Apparel 18 160 5334 -0.06 0.10 158 158 0.12 0.06
Manufacture of Leather Products and Footwear 19 138 3320 -0.04 0.10 139 139 0.16 0.09
Manufacture of Wood Products 20 126 788 0.04 0.12 128 128 0.21 0.09
Manufacture of Furniture 21 31 234 0.08 0.13 34 34 0.25 0.04
Manufacture of Paper and Paper Products 22 121 2412 0.03 0.09 120 120 0.24 0.05
Printing and Reproduction of Recording Media 23 35 796 0.03 0.09 36 36 0.13 0.06
Manufacture of Articles for Culture Activities 24 210 4146 -0.05 0.12 195 195 0.15 0.08
Processing of Petroleum, Coking 25 41 114 0.17 0.12 27 27 0.23 0.05
Manufacture of Raw Chemical Materials 26 903 4254 0.08 0.11 876 876 0.23 0.08
Manufacture of Medicines 27 151 458 0.07 0.11 55 55 0.24 0.07
Manufacture of Chemical Fibers 28 54 54 0.17 0.08 64 64 0.20 0.09
Manufacture of Rubber and Plastics Products 29 154 1329 0.06 0.11 156 156 0.24 0.06
Manufacture of Non-metallic Mineral Products 30 232 3212 0.02 0.11 240 240 0.23 0.06
Smelting and Pressing of Ferrous Metals 31 223 1053 0.13 0.13 239 239 0.31 0.07
Smelting and Pressing of Non-ferrous Metals 32 177 400 0.15 0.09 130 130 0.22 0.06
Manufacture of Metal Products 33 299 4844 0.02 0.12 293 293 0.23 0.07
Manufacture of General Purpose Machinery 34 470 4232 0.07 0.11 509 509 0.27 0.11
Manufacture of Special Purpose Machinery 35 406 2123 0.08 0.12 454 454 0.24 0.12
Manufacture of Automobiles 36 180 2624 -0.03 0.09 160 160 0.23 0.09
Manufacture of Transport Equipment 37 64 440 0.06 0.14 101 101 0.24 0.10
Manufacture of Electrical Machinery 38 302 4057 0.00 0.13 276 276 0.29 0.12
Manufacture of Computers, 39 228 656 0.06 0.15 227 227 0.26 0.16
Manufacture of Measuring Instruments 40 176 1012 0.04 0.11 205 205 0.28 0.15
Other Manufacture 41 57 1229 -0.04 0.12 40 40 0.14 0.07
Utilization of Waste Resources 42 26 55 0.23 0.10 30 30 0.19 0.08
Note: The table shows the mean and standard deviation of tariff changes for Chinese imports and exports across 2-digit GB/T sectors. A tariff change of 0.10 indicates a 10 percentage
point increase. For imports, China implemented both retaliatory tariff increases against the U.S., and MFN tariff cuts on sources of imports where MFN rates apply. Sectors with the
same number of targeted varieties and products in Columns (3) and (4) reflect import tariff increase targeting U.S. products without accompanying decrease in MFN tariffs. For Chinese
exports, which faced only U.S. tariff increases, the number of products targeted by trading partners is equal to that of varieties targeted. Due to space constraint, we aggregate sectors
of Agricultural products and of Mining.
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Table 3: Estimation of Variety-level Elasticities—Import Demand (σ) and Foreign Export
Supply (ω∗)
∆ ln p∗igtmigt ∆ lnmigt ∆ ln p
∗
igt ∆ ln pigt ∆ ln p
∗
igt ∆ lnmigt
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
∆ ln(1 + τigt) -1.133*** -1.121*** 0.009 1.004***
(0.2940) (0.2214) (0.1740) (0.1770)
∆ lnmigt -0.008
(0.1549)
∆ ln pigt -1.120***
(0.3158)
Country × Product FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Sector × Time FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
1st-stage F 40.179 81.805
Bootstrap CI [-0.146,0.204] [0.853,1.432]
R2 0.038 0.027 0.035 0.027 0.012 0.192
N 2,207,210 2,129,628 2,129,660 2,129,138 2,129,628 2,129,138
Note: The table reports the variety-level import responses to import tariffs. Columns (1) to (4) report the reduced-form
regression of different trade outcomes (before-duty import value, import quantity, before-duty unit value and duty-inclusive
unit value) on the tariff changes. Column (5) reports the IV regression estimation of foreign (inverse) export supply elasticity
ω̂∗ based on equation (29); with its first-stage estimation in Column (2). Column (6) reports the IV regression estimation
of import demand elasticity σ̂ based on equation (28); with its first-stage estimation in Column (4). Robust standard errors
(in parentheses) are clustered at the product and country level. 90% bootstrap confidence intervals of (ω̂∗ and σ̂) were
constructed from 1000 samples. The symbols ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗ indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level,
respectively. Sample: monthly variety-level import data from 2018:1 to 2019:12.
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Table 4: Estimation of Product-level Elasticity
∆ ln sMgt ∆ ln pMgt ∆ ln sMgt
(1) (2) (3)
∆ lnZMgt -1.537** 17.639***
(0.6271) (6.2563)
∆ ln pMgt -0.087***
(0.0230)
Sector × Time FE Y Y Y
1st-stage F 19.187
η̂ (se[η̂]) 1.087 (0.0230)
Bootstrap CI [1.041,1.131]
R2 0.015 0.010 0.351
N 226,372 226,372 226,372
Note: The table reports product-level import responses to import tariffs. Column (1) reports the reduced-form
regression of each imported product’s share within sectoral imports, sMgt, on the product-level instrument, ZMgt.
Column (2) reports the regression of the product-level import price index pMgt on ZMgt. Column (3) reports the
IV estimation of product-level elasticity based on equation (30); with its first-stage estimation in Column (2). The
product-level import price index is constructed using σ̂ from column (6) of Table 3 according to equation (31), and
the instrument is constructed using the statutory tariffs using equation (32). Robust standard errors (in parentheses)
are clustered at the product level. 90% bootstrap confidence intervals of η̂ were constructed from 1000 samples. The
symbols ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗ indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. Sample: monthly
product-level import data from 2018:1 to 2019:12.
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Table 5: Estimation of Sector-level Elasticity
∆ ln PMstMst
PDstDst
∆ ln PMst
pst
∆ ln PMstMst
PDstDst
(1) (2) (3)
∆ lnZMst -15.055 86.888
(9.7353) (201.2985)
∆PMst
pst
-0.173
(0.3208)
Sector FE Y Y Y
Time FE Y Y Y
1st-stage F 0.546
κ̂(se[κ̂]) 1.173 (0.3208)
Bootstrap CI [0.541,1.385]
R2 0.194 0.232 -
N 850 850 850
Note: The table reports sector-level import responses to import tariffs. Column (1) reports the reduced-form
regression of the ratio of the expenditure on foreign goods and domestic goods, PMstMst
PDstDst
, on the sector-level
instrument, ZMst. Column (2) reports the regression of the ratio of sector-level import price index and domestic
price index PMst
pst
on ZMst. Column (3) reports the IV estimation of sector-level elasticity based on equation (33);
with its first-stage estimation in Column (2). The sector import price index is constructed using σ̂ from Table 3,
column (6), and η̂ from Table 4, column (3), according to equation (34), and the instrument is constructed using
the statutory tariffs using equation (35). Robust standard errors(in parentheses) are clustered at the sector level.
90% bootstrap confidence intervals of κ̂ were constructed from 1000 samples. The symbols ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗ indicate
statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. Sample: monthly sector-level data from 2018:1
to 2019:12.
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Table 6: Estimation of Variety-level Elasticities—Foreign Import Demand (σ∗) and Chinese
Export Supply (ω)
∆ ln pXigtxigt ∆ lnxigt ∆ ln p
X
igt ∆ ln p
X
igt(1 + τ
∗
igt) ∆ ln p
X
igt ∆ lnxigt
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
∆ ln(1 + τ∗igt) -0.454*** -0.368*** -0.030 0.970***
(0.1330) (0.1065) (0.0664) (0.0664)
∆ lnxigt 0.083
(0.1809)
∆ ln pXigt(1 + τ
∗
igt) -0.379***
(0.1143)
Country × Product FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Sector × Time FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
1st-stage F 3.74 74.874
Bootstrap CI [-0.302,1.082] [0.142,0.608]
R2 0.044 0.029 0.042 0.029 - 0.156
N 5,473,204 5,431,219 5,431,219 5,431,219 5,431,219 5,431,219
Note: The table reports the variety-level export responses to U.S. import tariffs. Columns (1)–(4) report reduced-form regressions
of different export outcomes (export values, quantities, before-duty unit values, and duty-inclusive unit values) on the tariff changes.
Column (5) reports the IV estimation of (inverse) export supply elasticity based on equation (37); with its first-stage estimation in
Column (2). Column (6) reports the IV estimation of foreign import demand elasticity based on equation (36); with its first-stage
estimation in Column (4). Robust standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the HS-6 and country level. 90% bootstrap
confidence intervals of (ω̂ and σ̂∗) were constructed from 1000 samples. The symbols ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗ indicate statistical significance at
the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. Sample: monthly variety-level export data from 2018:1 to 2019:12.
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Table 7: Pre-trend Tests for Chinese Imports and Exports
Panel A1: China’s retaliatory tariffs on U.S. products
∆ ln p∗igmig ∆ lnmig ∆ ln p
∗
ig ∆ ln pig
(1) (2) (3) (4)
∆17−19 ln(1 + τig) 0.052 0.070 -0.029 -0.028
(0.1870) (0.2249) (0.1452) (0.1452)
Sector FE Y Y Y Y
R2 0.012 0.020 0.014 0.014
N 5,064 4,951 4,951 4,950
Panel A2: China’s MFN tariff cuts
∆ ln p∗igmig ∆ lnmig ∆ ln p
∗
ig ∆ ln pig
(1) (2) (3) (4)
∆17−19 ln(1 + τig) 0.720 0.803 0.115 0.115
(0.6089) (0.6978) (0.4236) (0.4237)
Country × Sector FE Y Y Y Y
Product FE Y Y Y Y
R2 0.144 0.144 0.132 0.132
N 66,886 64,844 64,844 64,820
Panel B: U.S. tariff increases on Chinese exports
∆ ln pXigxig ∆ lnxig ∆ ln p
X
ig ∆ ln p
X
ig(1 + τ
∗
ig)
(5) (6) (7) (8)
∆17−19 ln(1 + τ
∗
ig) 0.037 0.073 -0.002 0.003
(0.1209) (0.1178) (0.0845) (0.0817)
Sector FE Y Y Y Y
R2 0.007 0.012 0.005 0.005
N 5,483 5,473 5,473 5,445
Note: The table reports pre-trend tests for Chinese imports (Panels A1 and A2) and exports (Panel B)
at the variety level. The dependent variables are the average monthly change of trade outcome variables
during 2017:1–2017:12 in terms of before-duty trade value, quantity, before-duty unit value and duty-
inclusive unit value. Panels A1 and B regress the pre-war trade outcomes of Chinese imports from
(exports to) the U.S. on the (latest revised) tariff changes during the trade war period 2018:1–2019:12.
Panel A2 regresses the trade outcomes of Chinese imports from non-U.S. sources on China’s tariff
changes on non-U.S. sources of imports during the trade war. Robust standard errors (in parentheses) are
clustered at the product level (Panels A1 and B), and product and country level (Panel A2), respectively.
The symbols ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗ indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
Sample: monthly variety-level import and export data from 2017:1–2017:12 for the pre-trend variables,
and 2018:1–2019:12 for the tariff changes.
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Table 8: Aggregate Impacts
EV X EV M ∆R EV
(1) (2) (3) (4)
2018–2019 trade war
change ($ b) -17.093 -8.132 3.589 -21.636
[-37.629,5.860] [-14.311,-1.511] [2.651,4.884] [-44.171,2.778]
change (% GDP) -0.141 -0.067 0.030 -0.178
[-0.310,0.048] [-0.118,-0.012] [0.022,0.040] [-0.364,0.023]
2018–2019 trade war (w/o China’s MFN tariff cuts)
change ($ b) -11.629 -11.772 7.145 -16.256
[-31.849,15.765] [-17.495,-5.741] [6.154,8.781] [-36.874,13.330]
change (% GDP) -0.096 -0.097 0.059 -0.134
[-0.262, 0.130] [-0.144,-0.047] [0.051,0.072] [-0.304,0.110]
2018–2019 trade war (w/o retaliation by China)
change ($ b) -27.029 -0.289 -1.173 -28.491
[-48.375,-6.349] [-6.891,6.823] [-1.580,-0.581] [-50.517,-8.079]
change (% GDP) -0.223 -0.002 -0.010 -0.235
[-0.398,-0.052] [-0.057,0.056] [-0.013,-0.005] [-0.415,-0.067]
Note: The table reports the aggregate impacts in column (4) and the decomposition into EV X , EVM , and tariff revenue
(∆R) in columns (1)–(3). The top panel reports the effects from the 2018–2019 trade war. The bottom two panels
simulate hypothetical scenarios where China did not implement MFN tariff cuts in response to tariff increases against
the U.S., and where China did not retaliate against the U.S. or implement MFN tariff cuts as a result of the retaliation.
The first row in each panel reports the overall impacts of each term in billions of US$. The third row scales the value
by 2017 GDP of China. These numbers are computed using the model described in Section 3 and Appendix B, with
{σ̂ = 1.120, η̂ = 1.087, κ̂ = 1.173, ω̂∗ = −0.008, σ̂∗ = 0.379}. Bootstrapped 90% confidence intervals based on 1,000
simulations of the estimated parameters are reported in brackets.
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Table 9: Simulated Trade Diversion Impacts of the Trade War 2018–2019
∆ trade volume Trade share w/o war Trade share with war
(1) (2) (3)
Panel A. Imports
U.S. -12.47% 9.09% 8.17%
ROW -1.57% 90.91% 91.83%
North America -10.59% 11.01% 10.10%
Asia -1.73% 52.01% 52.46%
Europe -0.85% 19.17% 19.50%
Panel B. Exports
U.S. -7.74% 19.21% 18.11%
ROW -0.80% 80.79% 81.89%
North America -6.73% 22.22% 21.17%
Asia -0.64% 48.64% 49.38%
Europe -0.80% 19.00% 19.26%
Note: The table reports the simulated changes in China’s imports from and exports to its trading partners due to the
trade war, using the 2017 Chinese economy given the tariff changes of 2018–2019. Section B.3 provides the formulas.
Columns (2) and (3) report the trade shares by regions without the trade war and as a result of the trade war.
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Figure 1: Trade War Timeline
(A) U.S. statutory tariffs on Chinese exports
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(B1) Chinese retaliatory tariffs (on imports from U.S.)
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(B2) Chinese MFN tariff cut
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Note: The figure shows the unweighted average tariff rate of targeted import and export varieties
for each tariff wave before and after they were targeted. The numbering of the events corresponds
to those in Table 1. Refer to the Data Appendix for additional details on the construction of tariff
rates and the scaling of tariff increases when the implementation date is not on the first day of the
month. In drawing the above diagram, the implementation month is taken to be the current month
if the implementation date is before the 15th of the month and the next month otherwise.
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Figure 2: Regional Exposure to Tariff Increase of China and U.S.
(A) China’s Tariff Increase on U.S. Imports, 2018–2019
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(B) China’s MFN Tariff Decrease on Non-U.S. Imports, 2018–2019
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 Weighted by Variety-Level China Import Share and Province-Level 2017 Tradable Sector Employee Wage Bill
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(C) China’s Net Tariff Increase on Imports, 2018–2019
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Weighted by Variety-Level China Import Share and Province-Level 2017 Tradable Sector Employee Wage Bill
(D) U.S. Tariff Increase on China’s Exports, 2018–2019
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Weighted by Variety-Level China Export Share and Province-Level 2017 Tradable Sector Employee Wage Bill
Note: The figure shows province-level exposure to China’s tariff increases on U.S.
imports (Panel A), China’s MFN tariff decreases on non-U.S. imports (Panel B),
China’s net tariff increase (Panel C), and U.S. tariff increase on China’s exports
(Panel D), in relation to the trade war during 2018–2019, weighted by 2017 variety-
level China trade shares (constructed from customs data) and by 2017 province-
level tradable sector employee wage bill (constructed from China Labor Statistical
Yearbook). Darker shades indicate exposure to larger tariff changes. Values indicate
percentage point tariff changes.
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Figure 3: Simulated Real Wage Impacts from the Trade War
(A) Tradable Real Wage Loss from Tariff Increases of China and U.S.
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Legend displays percent  wage loss. Mean loss = 0.24%, std = 0.03%.
(B) Tradable Real Wage Loss from Tariff Increases of China and U.S.
(w/o the MFN tariff adjustment by China)
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Legend displays percent  wage loss. Mean loss = 0.28%, std = 0.05%.
Note: The figure shows province-level mean tradable wage losses as simulated from the
model. Panel A shows losses accounting for all import tariff changes by China and U.S. tariff
changes against China. Panel B shows losses in the counterfactual scenario where China did
not implement MFN tariff cuts in response to tariff increases against the U.S. Darker shades
indicate greater losses. Values indicate percent wage declines.
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Table A.1: Effects of Tariff Wars on China’s Imports and Exports (Partial Effects)
China’s tariff increase against U.S. products MFN tariff cuts Combined
IMPORT ∆ tariff ∆ import values ∆ tariff ∆ import values ∆ tariff ∆ import values
Varieties 15.84% -17.76% -3.97% 4.46% -1.50% 1.68%
Products 15.84% -1.38% -0.20% 0.02% -0.08% 0.01%
Sectors 15.56% -2.69% -0.19% 0.03% -0.07% 0.01%
U.S. tariff increase against Chinese products
EXPORT ∆ tariff ∆ export values
23% -9%
Note: The table reports the average change in tariffs and trade values at the variety, product, and sector level. The calculations use the elasticity estimates from
Tables 3–6. The formulas used in the calculations are provided in Sections 4.1–4.4.
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